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INTRODUCTION 
As a consequence of the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, 
the Government of India realised the need for cohesive 
long term planning of defence requirements and this 
resulted in the First National Defence Plan, formulated 
and announced in 1964, to be implemented over a period of 
five years. The expenditure on defence increased from 
Rs.3,310 million in 1961-62 to Rs.8,060 million in 1964-65 
and Rs.15,250 million in 1~71-72, to its present (1977-78) 
level of Rs.27,520 million. 1 Also, within a decade aft~r 
the 1962 conflict, India was involved in two maJor wars 
with Pakistan (1965 and 1971). 
Despite these significant events, there exists 
virtually no study of Indian defence policies during the 
post-1962 period, 2 nor, in a narrow context, any study of 
the defence reorganisation, expansion and modernisation 
program that was undertaken from 1964 onwards. The aim 
of this thesis is to attempt the latter task. It shall 
1 India - 1977 & 78 (Delhi: Publications Division, 
Govt. of India, 1978), p.41. All figures are in current 
Rupees and the expenditure for 1977-78 is based on budget 
estimates. 
2 Work has, however, been done on the 1947-62 period by 
Lorne J. Kavic, The Formation and Execution of Indian 
Defence Policy 1947-62, Ph.D Thesis, Australian National 
University, 1966. Later published as India's Quest for 
Security: Defence Policies 1947-1965 (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). 
2 
seek to make an overall survey of the changes that have 
taken place in the Indian defence structure i.e. the 
defence forces as well as the defence production uni ts, , 
during the 1964-1978 period. No attempt will . be made 
to go into the broader policy aspects of strategic threat 
perception or defence and foreign policy planning. 
The study is divided into five Chapters: 
Chapter I: Defence Planning 1964-78 
This Chapter will attempt to evaluate ·rndian weapons 
procurement and financial policy planning right from its 
formal inception in 1964. An effort. will be made to find 
out whether: 
1. there has been any consistency in planning 
or the basic rule has been one of ad hoc 
decisions cloaked as defence plans. 
2. the bureaucratic decision-making structure and 
personnel policies have increased in efficiency 
over the years. 
3. there was a consistent effort to expand and 
integrate the defence industrial base with the 
civil industrial sector, keeping in view the 
long term requirements.· Whether attempts at 
increasing self-sufficiency were guided by 
motives of prestige or whether they represented 
an effort to lessen dependence on rather unreliable 
suppliers wherein political considerations tended 
to predominate. 
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In other words, an attempt will be made to provide the 
background for subsequent discussion regarding the 
expansion and increasing sophistication of the armed forces. 
Chapter II: Indian army 1964-78 
The first Defence Plan envisaged an expansion of the 
Army to a well equipped force of twenty one divisions 
including four or five divisions with smaller establishments 
capable of expansion in an emergency. Ten of these divisions 
· were to be mountain divisions specially equipped, organised 
and trained for operations in the Himalayan region. This 
force level was determined by the possibility of having 
to fight a simultaneous war with China and Pakistan. 
Consequently, this Chapter will deal with the expansion, 
weapons acquisition and the politics thereof, during the 
period under study. 
Chapter III: Indian Navy 1964-78 
This branch of the Indian armed forces was relatively 
slow to modernise in the 1960s due to 
1. strategic threat perception 
2. financial constraints and possibly 
3. its lack of participation in actual hostilities. 
The role of the Navy in the 1971 war resulted in 
changes in the above mentioned factors and this decade 
is witnessing a sustained program of naval development. 
This will be examined and conclusions drawn as regards 
the kind of future role that the naval expansion seems to 
envisage. 
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Chapter IV: Indian Air Force 1964-78 
From a conglomeration of aircraft (e.g. Mysteres, 
Toofanis and _Vampires etc.) the Air Force has developed 
into a 'well balanced ' force of 45 Squadr_ons capable of 
providing tactical air support to the ground forces as 
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well as conducting bombing missions inside enemy territory. 
For political and financial reasons, so far Soviet aircraft 
have tended to predominate in its inventory. There has 
also been a domestic contribution to its strength in 
the form of HF-24, Gnats and French helicopters manufactured 
under licence. 
This Chapter will thus be a survey of the development 
of the Indian Air Force. 
Chapter V: Defence Production 1964-78 
The early 1960s witnessed attempts at acq_uiring self-
sufficiency in small arms and ammunition by developing 
the domestic defence production base and increasing 
investment in Defence Research and Development. Collaborative 
agreeements for the manufacture of sophisticated items 
like aircraft, frigates and missiles were sought and 
achieved, resulting in a modestly expanding domestic self-
. sufficiency. But the questions which arise and attempt 
will be made to answer: 
1. how much self-sufficiency has been attained and 
at what cost? 
2. has the increasing expenditure on Defence R & D 
resulted in any worthwhile achievements or have 
I 
the successes been more the result of 
collaborative joint ventures? 
3. has any attempt been made to harness the 
capacity of the civil industrial sector, 
and on the other hand,how much of production 
in the defence production units is for defence 
purposes? 
Assessment: 
In view of the discussion of its various aspects 
an effort will be made to make an overall assessment of 
the defence program during the 1964-78 period. 
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CHAPTER I 
DEFENCE PLANNING 1964-78 
The Decision-Making Structure: 
The Indian defence decision-making machinery evolved 
largely ad hoc after independence. 1 At the apex was 
the Defence Committee of the Cabinet with the Prime 
Minister (who was also the Minister of External Affairs) 
as Chairman. Other members included the Home, Finance 
and Defence Ministers with other ministers co-opted from 
time to time. The heads of the three Services, the 
Secretary, Ministry of Defence and the Financial Adviser 
(Defence) would also be present at the meetings of the 
. 2 Committee. · 
However, following the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, 
the Defence Committee of the Cabinet was replaced by one 
called the Emergency Copunittee of the Cabinet. The main 
difference in this new Committee was that the Chiefs of 
Staff and the Defence Secretary were no longer present at 
the meetings. At the same time a number of new committees 
came into existence in 1963, mainly entrusted with the 
task of accelerating the defence buildup. But sbon 
1 For a detailed account of the evolution of the decision-
making structure during the 1947-62 period see 
Nagendra Singh, The Defence Mechanism of the Modern State, 
(London: ·Asia Publishing ~ouse; fg64), ~p.162~174. 
2 ibid., p.172. 
afterwards, as the Chinese threat receded, 'these 
committees became gradually circumscribed in power and 
ultimately disappeared'. 3 
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The Ministry of Defence is characterised by a network 
of committees established at various levels. 4 At the top, 
and acting on behalf of the Defence Committee of the 
Cabinet, is the Defence Minister's Comrnittee. This is 
headed by the Defence Minister and includes junior Ministers, 
the three Service Chiefs, the Defence Secretary, Secretary, 
Department of Defence Production, the Scientific Adviser 
to the Minister of Defence and the Financial Adviser 
(Defence). 
This Comrnittee has two Sub-Comrnittees viz. Principal 
Personnel Officers Comrnittee and Principal Supply Officers 
Committee which consist of representatives of the Ministry 
of Finance (Defence), Ministry of Defence and the Services 
Headquarters. These are headed by the most senior Service 
representative on a rotation basis and their recommendations 
are considered by the Chiefs of Staff Committee before 
being submitted to the Defence Minister's Committee. The 
Chiefs of Staff Comrnittee comprises the three Service Chiefs 
with the member who has been longest on the Committee as 
Chairman. 
3 P.V.R. Rao, Defence Without Drift, (Bombay: Popular 
Prakashan, 1970), p.309. 
4 The organisation of the Ministry of Defence has remained 
largely unchanged since 1964-65 and information on this 
has been derived from Defence Services Estimates ·1977-78 
(Govt. of India, 1977), pp.93-96. 
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Besides, there are two more departments in the 
Ministry of Defence: (1) Department of Defence Production 
which controls the chain of Ordnance Factories in the 
country as well as the nine Defence Public Sector 
Undertakings, and, (2) Department of Defence Supplies. 
This was created in 1965 and deals with the indigenous 
development and production of items that were previously 
imported or are being introduced for the first time, as well 
as seeking to supplement the capacity of the Ordnance 
Factories. Operating through a number of Technical 
Committees,this department is entrusted with the task of 
adapting existing facilities both in the public as well 
as private sectors to meet defence requirements. 
These two departments come under the purview of the 
Defence Ministers' (Production and Supply) Committee which 
consists of all the members of the Defence Ministers' 
Committee as well as Additional Secretary, Department of 
Defence Supplies, .Additional Secretary, Ministry of Defence, 
the Director General of Inspection and the Director General 
of Ordnance Factories. There is also an inter-ministerial 
body, the Defence Production Board constituted 
in May, 1974,which oversees and takes decisions in respect 
of the Ordnance Factories. The Board has the Secretary 
(Defence Production) as its Chairman and representatives 
of the Departments of Economic Affairs, Expenditure, Defence 
Supplies, Defence and Industrial Development as Members. 
The Defence Research and Development Council, with 
the Defence Minister as Chairman is responsible for policy 
formulation and coordination of Defence R & D. 
9 
With regard· to financial control, there is a separate 
Division of the Ministry of Finance for dealing with all 
matters of the Ministry of Defence concerned with finance. 
The head of this Division is the Financial Adviser (Defence) 
who is responsible to the Minister of Finance. No 
expenditure can be authorised without the concurrence of 
the Financial Adviser or his representative. The Financial 
Adviser also attends meetings of all Committees dealing 
with defence matters and financial concurrence is generally 
accorded in three stages: (1) an examination of the proposal, 
(2) assessment of its financial implications and (3) if 
accepted, an examination and vetting of the final orders 
before issue. This process thereby ensures close control 
by the Finance Ministry. The Financial Adviser is also the 
Chief Accounting Officer for the Defence Services. He 
prepares the Budget and other estimates, and is 
ultimately responsible for internal audit although this 
responsibility is ·discharged through the Controller General 
of Defence Accounts. 
Functioning under the administrative control of the 
Ministry of Finance (Defence Division), the Defence Accounts 
Department .with the Controller General of Defence Accounts 
at its head, has an organisational structure broadly 
corresponding to the organisation of the three services. 
Thus, there is a Controller of Defence Accounts for each 
of the Commands in the case of the Army while the Navy and 
Air Force have their separate Controllers of Defence Accounts. 
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The above description of the rather formidable number 
of interlocking, sometimes overlapping, committees would 
suggest that all aspects of defence - policies, planning 
and production would receive extensive and critical 
attention at various levels before submission to the 
Cabinet or its subcommittee. But any attempt at 
evaluating the planning process faces the problem of lack 
of information. The Ministry of Defence discloses no 
details of the financial outlays or the intended purchases 
of weapons systems under the various plans. Neither is 
there any information available on the strategic planning 
methods. To add to this, public · interest in defence 
matters has never been very intense. This is especially 
true of the 1970s wherein there has been hardly any debate 
on problems of defence. 
Nonetheless, an attempt -is made below to evaluate 
the performance of the Indian defence planners in the fields 
of equipment procurement and financial policy-making on 
the . basis of the rather scanty information provided in 
the Annual Reports of the Ministry of Defence. 
The Defence Plans: 
In an attempt to build up Indian defences after the 
Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, the Government formulated a 
Defence Plan in 1963-64 which envisaged: 
(a) the buildup and maintenance of a well equipped 
Army with a sanctioned strength of 825,000 men. 
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(b) modernisation and maintenance of a 45 Squadron 
Air Force including the improvement of air 
defence radar and communication systems. 
(c) a progra.m for the replacement of over-age 
ships of the Navy. 
(d) improvement of road communications in border 
areas . . 
(e) strengthening the defence production base. 5 
The Plan involved a financial outlay of Rs.SO billion 
including expenditure on expansion, modernisation and 
maintenance. 6 However, this program was not based on 
any long term requirements plan but was just an attempt at 
defining objectives and requirements. The expenditure 
involved was just the sum total of the estimated yearly 
budgets over a five year period7 i.e. an outlay of Rs.10 
billion per year. 
Moreover, the program involved a substantial degree 
of foreign assistance both in terms of technical know how 
and material and financial aid. It was in this context 
that the then Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan visited U.K., 
U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. in 1964-65. The trips were 
reasonably successful. The Soviet Union agreed to equip 
three MiG squadrons besides providing facilities for their 
manufacture, some light tanks and miscellaneous equipment. 
5 Report 1964-65, pp.1-2. 
6 ibid. , p. 2. 
7 Report 1969-70, pp."6-7. 
I· 
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BrLtain decided to provide a loan for the indigenous 
manufacture of Leander Class frigates and also agreed in 
principle to provide facilities for the manufacture of a 
submarine for the Indian Navy. The United States agreed 
to supply various types of equipment besides assisting 
in setting up an Ordnance Factory. 8 
However, before much could be achieved, the modernisation 
program was interrupted because of the Inda-Pakistan war 
in 1965 and the subsequent embargo placed by the U.S. and 
the U.K. Not only did military aid and assistance cease 
but the creation of new production capacities also suffered 
a setback since these too were dependent to some extent, 
on procurement of supplies from abroad, especially from 
the two abovementioned countries. Another factor which 
impeded progress was that, apart from the cost of the war, 
the increase in defence spending was already having its 
effects on the country's economy. Resources had to be 
directed from the already restricted Development Plan funds 
and the States w~re reported to have be~n told by the 
Central Government that they would have to raise their own 
resources.
9 Also, three emergency mobilis~tion schemes 
to raise additional finance were announced. These were in 
8 Report 1964-65, p.2. This aspect is discussed at length 
in later Chapters. 
9 The then Deputy Chairman of the Planning Corrunission, 
Ashok Mehta pointed out in November, 1965 that resources for 
the Development Plan programs in 1966-67 would be only a 
little over Rs.19 billion (even less than the modest Rs.20.8 
billion that had been tentatively agreed) as compared to 
Rs. 22. 5 billion for 1965-66. See Times 'of India, September 3, 
October 19 and November 17, 1965. 
~ 
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the form of National Defence Loans, 15 Year Gold Bonds 
and a scheme to encourage foreign exchange remittances 
from Indians living abroad. 10 
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At its meeting on September 5-6, 1965, the National 
Development Council authorised the Chairman of the Planning 
Commission to review the Development Plans, and a planning 
cell was set up at the Ministry of Defence in November 1965 
to ensure that those elements of the Development Plans 
that had a bearing on defence were given 'appropriate 
' ' ' I 
11 f f l' priorities. A new Department o De ence Supp ies was 
created to locate indigenous sources for the manufacture 
of defence equipment that was hitherto imported. 12 The 
Department was also entrusted with the task of developing 
the electronics industry in the country. 13 The Planning 
Commission also set up 9 technical Study Groups consisting 
of representatives of the Department of Defence Production14 
and other concerned Ministries to suggest measures to give 
a defence orientation to various sectors of industry. 15 
lO Times of India, October 20, 1965. 
11 Report 1.9 6 5 - 6 6 , p . 6 . 
12 'b'd 1 1 ., p.5. 
13 Report 1970-71, p.87. In 1970 this work was transferred 
to the Cabinet Secretariat. 
14 This department was ·itself a relatively new establishment , 
having been formed bare.ly 3 years ago, in November, 1962. 
See A.L. Venkateshwaran, Defence Organisation in India 
(Govt. of India Publications Division, 1967), .p. 30L. 
15 These were: aeronautics, electronics, shipbuilding, 
alloy · and special steels, explosives and chemicals, textiles 
and general stores, instrumentation, non-ferrous metals 
and alloys, vehicles and engineering equipment. See 
Report 1965-66 , p.65. Also, Times of India, December 7, 
1965. 
~ 
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Thus, the events of 1965-66 had a threefold effect: 
(a) the imprementation of the defence plan was 
delayed because of both the cessation ot 
assistance from abroad and economic difficulties 
at home. The latter, while not impinging 
upon aims, did rather inflate the costs. 
(b) they gave an added impetus towards indigenisation 
and self reliance. Greater emphasis was laid 
on Defence R & D and as is discussed later, 
concerted efforts at import substitution were 
at tempted. 
(c) due to diversion of resources from the development 
plan funds, 16 industrial development suffered a 
setback, which, in the long run, would also affect 
the attempts at attaining self-sufficiency in the 
manufacture of defence equipment. 
Consequently, implementation of the first Defence Plan 
would seem to have proceeded in a rather haphazard and 
erratic manner. Against a total outlay of Rs.SO billion 
that had been envisaged, the actual expenditure in the 
1964-69 period amounted to Rs.46 billion (approx.) . 17 
This would suggest that modernisation of the armed forces 
16 As a result, the fourth Five Year Development Plan, 
originally scheduled to commence in 1966 was postponed 
for three years. See Wing Cdr. Maharaj K. Chopra, 
'India on the Eve of the Second Defense Plan', Military 
Review, January 1969, p.6. 
17 Indian Defence Budget 1972-73: A Seminar Report 
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, Vol.4, 
No.4, April 1972, p.434. 
~ 
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was delayed not because of lack of resources, but due to 
difficulties in the procurement of equipment from abroad. 
This in turn also had adverse effects on domestic defence 
production. 
It was only from 1969 onwards i.e. with the (second) 
1969-74 Defence Plan that efforts at long term perspective 
planning were initiated. Although no details of what the 
plan envisaged or the financial outlay involved were 
disclosed, it was stated that changes in strategic 
requirements and tactical concepts had been incorporated. 
Based on a ten-year forecast of requirements, the Rupee 
and foreign exchange requirements for the plan period had 
been assessed and assurance obtained from the Government 
that they would be available as per plan. In an attempt 
to encourage the three Services to be cost effective, 
allocations were made for the entire period of five years. 18 
The decision-making process at the Ministry of Defence 
was also updated with the incorporation of modern management 
techniques like systems analysis, operations research 
value engineering, project management and the use of 
computers. 19 Nevertheless, the planning process would 
still seem to have been rather narrow in its focus and 
very susceptible to any unforeseen circumstances. This 
is because, as events of later years showed, there is no 
18 Report 1969-70, p.7. 
19 Report 1970-71, p.8. 
• 
evidence of any sort of contingen~y planning. Besides, 
the pictuie that emerges is that of a new plan being 
formulated almost every year. The very next year, in 
1970-71, it was announced that the planning process had 
been modified slightly in that, the defence plan would 
16 
· 20 
now be based on the 'Roll~On' concept. There would be 
an annual review of the plan and another year added 
to replace the one that had just lapsed. In other words, 
there would always be a five year plan at any given 
point of time. 
The long term objective behind the formulation of 
defence plan during this period were twofold: 
(a) to acquire weapons technologies along with 
weapons systems. If this was not possible, 
the emphasis was to be on the development of 
support facilities such as the manufacture 
of spares, ammunition, overhaul and repair 
f · 1 · . 21 aci ities. 
(b) that the future approach to defence production 
would be increasingly technology oriented rather 
than product oriented, as had been the case 
earlier A composite plan for the development 
of science and technology was sought to be 
22 formulated. 
20 .b'd ii., p.7. 
21 Report 1971-72, p.19. The second alternative would be 
particularly relevant to acquisitions from the Soviet Union 
wherein there is no evidence of the latter's willingness to 
provide technology along with weapons. 
22 ibid., p.22. 
~ 
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These objectives by themselves did not represent any 
radical or innovative change in Indian defence planning. 
On the other hand they amounted to a restatement of decisions 
made during the first plan period. 
Implementation of the Roll-On Plan was disrupted 
a year after its formulation due to the 1971 war. Because 
of the crisis, it was officially stated, 'certain imbalances 
in crucial areas had to be made · good rapidly ... priorities 
had to be varied and earlier plans telescoped. It was 
not found possible to adhere fully to the discipline and 
the pattern of the Ro'll-On Plan•. 23 This amounted to a 
virtual admission of the fact that in defence planning 
there was no provision for any contingencies whatsoever, 
because the situation took quite some time to build up 
to crisis proportions and the subsequent outbreak of war. 
Events of the remaining period of the plan i.e. 1972-1974 
also tend to confirm this conclusion. It was decided to 
correlate the Defence plans for the remaining years with 
h 24 h' t e annual budgets of the Central Government. Tis 
situation would seem to be a repetition of the first plan 
period wherein planning was an exercise that amounted to 
the formulation of yearly budgets. 
Preparations for the formulation of the next . (1974-79) 
Roll-On Plan were also strongly reminiscent of the period 
of the preparation of the 1969-74 Plan. A Planning Group 
23 
Report 1971-72, p.20. 
24 . Report 1972-73, p.10. 
·411 
was set up in 1973-74 to make recommendations for the 
Defence Plan, 25 which, it was announced, would be co-
terminous with the 5th Five-Year Development Plan. 26 
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The priorities set forth in their proposals were, 
however, reviewed a few months later because of both the 
increase in oil prices and inflation in the domestic 
economy. In its usual vague manner, the Ministry of 
Defence announced in 1975 that it had also been decided 
to keep the Plan 'flexible and adaptable to changes in 
the pattern of international relationships, the strategic 
and tactical concepts and changes in technology•. 27 
This would seem to be an admission of the fact that the 
planners had yet to develop the necessary expertise/ 
competence in defence planning based on long term 
requirements. 
One reason given for these revision exercises was 
the fact that, given the intention to develop a substantial 
defence production base, plans had to be formulated under 
severe financial ceilings and budgetary constraints. 28 
But then, the financial handicap would not be an unforeseen 
factor in the Indian context. Also, the fact remains that 
25 Report 1974-75, p.6. 
26 The 1969-74 Defence Plan had also been originally 
envisaged as being co-terminous with the 4th Five-Year 
Development Plan. 
27 Report 1974-75, p.7. 
28 ibid., p.12. 
411 
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the 1974-79 Defence Plan seems to have undergone 
substantial revision quite frequently ever since its 
inception. As mentioned earlier, the recommendations of 
the planning group had been reviewed a few months after 
they had been made, in 1974. In 1975, the reason given 
was that of large scale acquisition of military hardware 
by 'neighbours•. 29 The situation was reviewed again in 
April 1976 with the intention of preparing a Roll-On Plan 
for 1976-81. Instead, it was decided to consider new 
schemes for the 1974-79 ,plan. 30 This admission reveals 
some kind of ambiguity · in planning since both the 1974-79 
as well as the 1976-81 plans are supposed to be based on 
the Roll-On concept. Various reasons were given for this 
action, in that this had become necessary because of earlier 
omissions, cost escalations and the higher cost of production 
. . d. . 31 in in igenous industry. 
Conclusions: 
As can be inferred from the above account, defence 
planning in India has been based on a series of ad hoc 
measures. Although it was officially 
conceded that the First (1964-69) Plan was no plan at all 
in the real sense of the term, the planning process does 
not seem to have undergone a very substantial change in 
later years either. 
29 Report 1976-77, p.4. 
30 Report 1977-78, p.5. 
31 'b'd i i . 
~ 
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The problems faced in the 1964-69 period are 
understandable. It was the first time after independence 
that the question of defence had reviewed serious attention. 
Shortly afterwards came the embargoes by the Western 
Powers in 1965. The consequence was a serious reconsideration 
of the implied reliance on the West that had been envisaged 
earlier. There was also the problem of diverting resources 
to finance defence requirements. 
Even then, there is not much evidence to support 
the argument that there was an overall attempt after 1965 
to gear· the economy towards self reliance in defence. As 
a former Secretary of the Ministry of Defence has observed, 
a certain amount was done to align industrial development 
to defence requirements 'but it was generally mainly in bits 
d . . d . 1 . d . 1 ' 32 an pieces, not as an integrate nationa in ustries pan. 
In other words, industries related directly to defence 
(e.g. ordnance factories) were strerigthened but there was 
no attempt at the development of the civil industrial sector 
as part of a comprehensive effort. 
Defence Research and Development began to be emphasised 
only after the events of 1965-66. But, the problem here 
again was one of attempting to develop competence without 
taking into account the capacity and capability of the 
industrial infrastructure. More often than not, there have 
been cases where various items of equipment were developed 
and it was discovered only later that there was no 
32 S.S. Khera, India's Defenca Problems · (New Delhi: Orient 
Longmans, 1968), p.261. 
~ 
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manufacturer competent to take up production on a large 
scale. 33 It is only recently that some attempts are 
being made to ensure cooperation between Defence R & D 
establishments and the prospective manufacturers from the 
very initial stages of development of various items. 
Even a superficial survey of the planning attempts 
from 1969 onwards shows the disorganised nature of defence 
planning. Plans seem to undergo drastic revision nearly 
every year if not more frequently. Although, at least 
in theory, the Roll-On concept in planning was introduced 
as early as 1970, the 1969-74 plan itself had to be more 
or less given up after the 1971 war. What followed was 
a three year period during which all planning amo~nted to 
the formulation of yearly budgets. This was· a situation 
strongly reminiscent of the 1960s. Still later, much 
was made of the 1974-79 plan in that it was to be implemented 
along with the development plan for the period i.e. there 
was an attempt at correlating defence and development. 
But the plan seems to have needed frequent revisions ever 
since its inception. 
Another interesting aspect of planning from 1974 onwards, 
is that in practice, the roll-on concept seems to have been 
abandoned. This is because, as mentioned earlier, a review 
in 1976 to prepare the 1976-81 Roll-On Plan resulted in 
new schemes being included in the 1974-79 plan. Thus, 
it would be very difficult to visualise a multiplicity of 
33 Defence R & Dis discussed in detail in the Chapter on 
Defence Production. 
~ 
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roll-on plans being implemented simultaneously. This 
would have to be the case if it was accepted that both the 
1974-79 as well as the 1976-81 plans were based on the 
roll-ori concept. 
The only conclusion that could then be drawn from the 
above is that defence planning still proceeds on a year-to-
year basis. Although there has been some improvement over 
the last decade,in that there are assured resources, and 
modern management techniques have been adopted, much still 
rem~iqs to be achieved. Decision-makers would still seem 
to have a lot to learn before they develop the degree of 
competence that is essential for long term forecasting 
and planning. 
There are many reasons which are responsible for the 
frequent changes that characterise the course of Indian 
defence planning. The system of staffing in the Ministry 
of Defence does not provide for the development of experttse 
among decision-makers. In the words of a former Defence 
Ministry official: 
'•'. .. emphasis is on the tenure sy-stem, 
evolved in the pre-independence days, 
which is based on the presumption that 
an intelligent generalist should be able 
to tackle almost any secretariat post ... 
the tendency is to rely on the 
recommendations of the Services ... and 
try to fit them into certain predetermined 
budgetary ceilings.34 
34 K. Subrahmanyam, 'Academic Contribution to National 
Security Policy Formulation in India', Institut~ for Defence 
Studies and Ahalyses Journal, Vol.l, No.2, January 1969, 
p.88. 
• 
,. 
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This implies that decision-making is predominantly the 
domain of the senior officers of the three Services with 
their civilian counterparts having only a secondary role 
in ·the process. Also, the inevitable consequence of this 
would be tha.t any discontinuity in the recommendations of 
the Services Headquarters would ultimately be reflected 
in the decisions taken by the Government. 
Another problem in this context that still persists 
is the lack of interaction between the decision-makers of 
the Ministry of Defence and· academic institutions. Added 
to this is the fact that International Relations in general 
and Strategic Studies in particular, are fields that are 
not wei1 developed in Indian Universities or other 
institutions. 35 Consequently, there is not much of external 
input, both in terms of talent or ideas in defence decision-
k . 36 ma ing. 
Lastly, over the years, there has been virtually no 
public debate on any aspect of national security or defence 
planning. A major contributing factor in this regard has 
35 For example, the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 
and Jadavpur University of Calcutta are the only two 
iristitutions that have full fledged departments of 
International Relations. A few other universities run 
area study centers or offer courses in what is termed 
'military science'. The Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analyses at New Delhi which was _ created a decade ago 
with the intention of developing expertise on defence and 
strategic issues has not been able to live upto expectations 
either. 
36 K. Subrahmanyam, n.30, p.92. 
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been the fact that no level of the defence decision-
making process is open to any form of scrutiny by the 
public or even by Parliament. 37 Reasons of National 
Security is the blanket excuse that has inevitably been 
used by the Government in its refusal to disclose any 
information that might open it to criticism. 
37 For a good study of the ineffective role of the 
Parliament in matters related to defence problems see 
24 
Cecil B. Jones Jr., How ·the· India·n Lok Sabha· Han·a1es Defense 
Matters ·- An 'Institutional Study, Ph.D Thesis (Unpublished), 
The American University, 1975. 
• 
CHAPTER II 
INDIAN ARMY 1964-78 
Until 1962, contingency planning for the Army was 
based on the assumption that India would not have to 
fight a simultaneous war with China and Pakistan. 1 
25 
This perception, however, changed after the Sino-Indian 
conflict of 1962 and ·it was decided to raise the strength 
2 3 
of the Army from about . 350,000 to 825,000. The Army 
was conceived as a well-equipped force of about twenty-
one divisions including four infantry divisions on a 
reduced establishment, capable of expansion at short 
notice. 4 Ten of these divisions would be mountain 
divisions, as selt-contained as possible, with emphasis 
on increased fire-power and mobility. 
The bulk of the recruitment of officers and .men 
had been com!leted by 1964-65, except for some shortages 
persisting in certain technical branches. 5 About 9,000 
officers had been granted Emergency Commissions (EC) since 
November 1962, 6 with the last of the EC courses passing 
1 Lorne J. Kavic, India's· Quest for Secur·i ty: Defence Policies, 
1-947-1965 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1967), p.88. 
2 'b' i id., p.97. 
3 India. Ministry of Defence, Report 1964- 65, p.l. 
(Hereafter referred to as· Rep·ort) . 
4 Lorne J. Kavic, n.l, p.194. 
5 Report 1964-65, p.17. 
6 ibid. ' p.19. 
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out from the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun, 
and the Officers Training School (OTS), Madras, in 
October, 1964 and Ap+il, 1965 respectively. The OTS 
26 
at Poona which had been established for training EC 
officers was closed down in July 1964 and regular courses· 
for Permanent Commissioned officers were re-introduced at 
the IMA, while OTS Madras took up the task of training 
Non-Technical, Short Service Commissioned (SSC) officers 7 
as non-technical officer targets were achieved. 
To meet the shortage of technical officers, many 
concessions were granted in order to attract volunteers. 
These included ante-dated commissions based on period of 
civil service and reservation of jobs after release from 
the Army. 8 Even these inducements do not seem to have 
been very effective, for in 1965, a new set of measures 
was announced. Under the Compulsory Service 
Scheme, all engineers under the age of 30 years working 
in the Central or State governments and Public Sector 
Undertakings were liable to serve for a minimum period 
of 4 years in the Army. 9 
To meet increased requirements for the training of 
Other Ranks (ORs), 15 new training centres were established 
and existing centres expanded. The duration of training 
7 ibid., p.23. 
8 . b. i id., p.19. 
9
· Report 1965-66, p .15. To supplement the capacity of the 
College of Military Engine·ering, 32 army officers were 
also deputed to attend engineering courses at various 
civil engineering .colleges. 
was also reduced initially and was later restored 
progressively as trained personnel became available. 10 
The period of colour service for OR's was also reduced. 
Formerly, they could be in colour service for a period 
of 7-15 years with provisions for extension for another 
5-10 years, depending on the type of service (technical 
or non-technical). From January, 1965 the period of 
maximum colour service was reorganised as follows: 11 
Group I 
Group II 
(non-technical) 
( technical) 
Group III (highly technical) 
The provisions for extensions were withdrawn. 
10 years 
12 years 
15 years 
2·1 
The training program was also reoriented towards 
mountain warfare and the capacity of the High Altitude 
Warfare School was doubled as battle inoculation (simulated 
battle training) was reintroduced. 12 A Corrunando Course 
for officers was introduced at the Infantry School, Mhow, 
13 from March, 1964. 
Substantial reorganisation of the Army Headquarters 
also took place. The new Directorate of Combat Development, 
which had been set up in November 1963 to look after 
development of weapons and tactical concepts was placed 
under a full-time director with the rank of Brigadier in 
10 . f d. Times o In ia, March 14, 1964. 
11 
· Report 1964-65, pp.18-19. 
12 H' d in u (Madras), October 21, 1963. 
13 Report 1964-65, p. 2 3. 
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1965. 14 The responsibilities of the Chief of General 
Staff (CGS) were redistributed between the Deputy Chief 
of Army Staff (redesignated Vice Chief of Army Staff) 
and the CGS (redesignated Deputy Chief of Army Staff). 
The post of Deputy CGS was abolished and the appointments 
of Director of Staff Duties (DSD) and Deputy DSD were 
upgraded from the ranks of Brigadier and Colonel to Major 
General and Brigadier respectively. 15 The post of Director 
of Military Operations was also upgraded from Brigadier 
to Major General and that of the Deputy Director of 
Military Intelligence from Colonel to Brigadier16 as the 
strength of the Military Intelligence Directorate increased 
17 by about 50 per cent. 
A new Central Command had already been formed out 
of the Eastern Command in 196318 and in 1965 Delhi Area 
.was carved out from the old Delhi and Rajasthan Area, with 
the Rajasthan Area being put under a separate General Officer 
d . 19 Conunan ing. The Jammu and Kashmir Militia which had been 
raised primarily as a temporary police force in 1947 was 
reorganised as a permanent force within the Army. 20 
14 Report 1965-66, p.12. 
15 Report 1964-65, p.18. 
16 Report 1965-66, p.12. 
17 Lorne J. Kavic, p.195. 
18 ibid. 
19 Report 19.65-66, p.13. 
20 Reeort 1964-65, p.18. 
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A new 'discard before overhaul' policy for the Army's 
vehicle fleet was also evolved, under which 1 ton and 3 ton 
vehicles were to be replaced on completion of 35,000 miles 
or 7 years service - .whichever was later but before any 
major overhaul. As a result of this replacement policy 
over 35,000 vehicles were declared for disposal in just 
three yea.?:s - 1964-67. 21 The acquisition of vehicles was 
also standardised in the form of Shaktiman 4x4 and Tata 
Mercedes Benz 4x4, 3 ton trucks, Dodge and Nissan 1 ton 
trucks, Nissan Patrol and Willy's Jeeps and Royal Enfield 
22 
motorcycles. 
Decisions were also made to provide the Army with 
modern weapons, equipment and stores. It was decided 
to standardise all small arms to the 7.2 mm bore. 23 
The · .303 Lee-Enfield rifles were to be replaced by the 
semi-automatic Ishapore model 7.62 mm rifles and the Sten 
machine carbines by the Sterling, also of British origin , 
being produced indigenously. 24 An indigenously designed 
mortar replaced the 4.2 in.mortar hitherto in use 25 and 
the French manufactured Brandt heavy mortar, originally 
received under the aid program later began to be produced 
indigenously. 26 Modified Chieftain tanks of British design, 
21 Report 1966-67, p.16. 
22 Report 1964-65, p.25. 
23 ibid. 
24 Lorne J. Kavic, p.195. 
25 ibid. 
26 Re 12_9 r "t. 19 6 4 - 6 5 , p . 2 5 . 
30 
the Vijayanta began to be manufactured under licence 
at Avadi from 1965-66 27 and licence was also acquired 
for the indigenous manufacture of 106 mm recoilless guns 
from the USA. 28 One area where modernisation seems to 
have been a problem was signals, communication and 
engineering equipment. This was because of an insufficiently 
developed electronic base in the countt.y at that time and 
requirements had to be met via imports, either under aid 
programs or on credit terms although steps were being 
taken simultaneously to improve indigenous manufacture at 
Bharat Electronics (BEL) under collaboration agreements. 29 
But despite all ~£forts, even as late as 1966, the situation 
regarding signals equipment was 'not entirely satisfactory•. 30 
The brief war with Pakistan in 1965 and the subsequent 
British and American embargoes did upset the reequipment 
program as of a total of Rs.760 million promised as 
military aid by the United States, approximately 45 percent 
(Rs.361.3 million) had been delivered before the embargo 
and this had been utilised for providing support for a 
number of mountain divisions as well as earth moving 
equipment for the Border Roads Organisation. Britain had 
27 Discussed in detail in the chapter on defence production. 
28 K. Subrahmanyam, 'Nehru and the India-China Conflict 
of 1962' in B.R. Nanda ed. Indian Poreigh Policy: Th~ Nehru 
Years (Delhi: Vikas, 1976), p.115. 
29 Report 1964-65, p.26. 
30 Report 1965-66, p.17. 
31 
promised Rs.360 million under the aid program and had 
delivered about Rs.224.1 million worth of equipment and 
31 
spares. 
One direct consequence of the embargo was a change 
in the government's arms acquisition policy32 and the 
Soviet Union, which was already supplying India with 
military hardware, was soon to emerge as the predominant 
supplier of arms. Thus, between 1965-66 and 1968-69 the 
USSR is reported to have provided India with about 450 
T-·54 and T-55 medium tanks and some 350 100 mm and 140 
33 130 mm guns. Another effect was to accelerate steps 
towards indigenous manufacture of equipment and by 1969-70 
the reequipment of Infantry units had been completed while 
'considerable progiess' had been made with artillery 
d d . 34 an armoure units. 
In view of the experience gained in the 1965 Indo-
Pakistan war, some internal reorganisation was undertaken 
and formations were further streamlined with a view to 
31 See statement of the then Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan, 
in Parliament on November 29, 1965. Reported in· Times of 
India, November 30, 1965. 
32 Calling the embargoes 'unpardonable' in a speech to 
the Central Purchase Advisory Council, the then Minister 
of Supply and Technical Development, K. Raghuramaiah, 
indicated that future purchases would be made in countries 
'more dependable' in a crisis. See Times of India, December 1, 
1965. 
33 Military Balance· 1968-69, p.47. 
34 Report 1969-70, p.14. 
I: 
improving the teeth-to-tail ratio. Emphasis was laid 
on the stu.dy of eneimr tactical concepts and battle 
. 1 . d 1 · t · 35 inocu ation courses were ma e more rea is ic as 
. d . h . 36 armoured formations concentrate on nig t operations. 
·32 
The organisation of the mountain divisions was also 
reviewed in the light of suggestions that they be broken 
up into smaller units for greater mobility and effectiveness 
but it was subsequently decided to make no changes. 37 
Training courses for officers too were further modified 
and improved. The duration of the Defence Services Staff 
College course was increased from 30 to 45 weeks. 38 The 
Infantry School at Mhow was bifurcated into an Infantry 
School and a College of Combat and new courses were 
introduced for Young O~f ice,rs, Junior Commanders and Staff 
Officers. A. new Institute of Defence Management for the 
training of middle level defence personnel was set up at 
39 Secundrabad . . 
As a result of the various steps towards reorganisation 
and streamlining, although the strength of the Army remained 
constant since 1964 at 828,000 men, fighting capability 
increased considerably over the years so that by 1971-72 
it comprised 25 Infantry Divisions (including mountain 
35 Report 1966-67, pp.12-13. 
36 Report 1969~70, p.15. 
37 ibid., p.14. 
38 Report 1966-67, p.14. 
39 
.Report 19 70-71, pp .13-14. 
33 
divisions) as compared to 21 Infantry Divisions originally. 40 
The 1970s also saw the formulation of a long term plan 
for a new and sophisticated electronic system as new 
electronic and communications equipment began to be 
. d d 41 intro uce. Called the Army Radio Engineered Network 
(AREN), this envisages a mobile and integrated system 
for the field army based entirely on indigenous design, 
development and production effort and involves licence 
manufacture or imports. 42 The plan is . being implemented 
in two phases: 
1. existing equipment will be modified to 
provide a 'secure' radio trunk system using . 
manual instead of automatic switching 
2. in the second phase, an integrated communication 
system with auto-switching on an area grid 
b . 43 asis. 
Nevertheless by 1978 the project still seems to be 
substantially in the development and evaluation stage. 44 
Along with the implementation of the communications 
network, an Electronic Data Processing System (EDPS) is 
also being set up for the Army. The Army Integrated 
40 Report 1971-72, p.44. While these are official estimates 
giving the overall strength, according to the Military Balahce 
19 71-72 (p. 46) , the mfan try strength during this year included 
13 infantry divisions, 10 ·mountain divisions, 6 independent 
infantry brigades and 2 parachute brigades. 
41 Report 1970-71, p.12. 
4 2 Report 19 7 4 - · 7 5 , p . 3 2 . 
43
· Report 1977-78, p.15. 
44 ibid., p.16 also Report ·1975--76, pp.16-17. 
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Telecommunication Data System Plan envisages a number of 
EDP Centers to be established covering formation headquarters, 
ordnance depots, workshops and other establishments in 
order to meet computer requirements of all arms and s·ervices. 
Two computer systems (including one for training purposes) 
have already been established and a third is expected to 
. 45 
be installed shortly. 
Further organisational changes have taken place in 
the 1970s as a result of the 1971 war. .The unwieldy 
Western Command was split into two with the new Northern 
Command being created to cover J ·ammu and Kashmir ( J & K) , 
Punjab and certain areas of Himachal Pradesh while the 
Western Command includes Rajasthan and Gujarat. 46 This 
change was obviously very necessary because under the old 
set up,a single command had jurisdiction ranging from the 
mountainous terrain in J & Kand Himachal Pradesh to the 
deserts of Rajasthan, thereby creating administrative and 
logistic problems. A new reservist policy also came into 
effect from February 1976 under which all OR's would be 
retained in colour service for at least 15 years in order 
to enable them to earn a pension. 47 Also, previously 
war casualties were replaced by reservists, but it was 
realised that this was a time consuming process and, as a 
45 Report 19.77-78, p.17. 
46 
'Report 1972-73, p.21. 
47
· Report 1975-76, p.17. 
35 
consequence, there has been an enhancement of the ceiling 
strength although the exact number has not been disclosed 
officially. 48 
However, the increase in overall numbers does not 
seem to have been prompted by the new reservist policy 
alone. Latest estimates place the strength of the Indian 
Army at 950,00o. 49 If these are reliable, it would mean 
an increase of roughly 123,000 men over the last few years. 
This is certainly borne out by a comparison of the number 
of formations during the years 1972 and 1978. In 1972 
there were reported to be 13 infantry d~visions, 10 mountain 
divisions, 6 independent infantry brigades and two parachute 
b . d 50 riga es. On the other hand, by 1978, the Army is 
reported to include 17 infantry divisions (with l more 
forming), 10 mountain divisions, 1 independent infantry 
brigade and 1 parachute brigade. During this· period there 
has also been an addition of two independent armoured 
b . d 51 riga es. 
As mentioned earlier, while the re-equipment of . infantry 
units had been completed by the late 1960s, the process of 
modernising and expanding the artillery and armoured 
formations had made only limited progress. Even in 1971, 
the artillery units c6n_sisted mostly of 25 pounders besides 
48 
· Report 1979-77, p.12. 
49 Military Balance 1979-79, p.61. 
50 Military Balanc~ 1972-73, p.48. 
51 Refer n.49. 
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the limited number of 100 nun and 130 mm guns imported 
from the Soviet Union. 52 Thi.s situation, however, improved 
considerably in the 1970s, as production of various weapons 
was finally taken up. Domestically manufactured artillery 
weapons supplied to the Army included the 75/24 mm pack 
howitzers and 105 mm field guns 53 as also French designed 
81 mm and 120 mm mortars 54 and the 40 mm L70 anti-aircraft 
guns under licence · f .rom Bofors. Besides, the manufacture 
under licence of the SS-11 and ENTAC Anti-Tank missiles 
was also taken up. 55 Imports from the Soviet Union included 
BTR-50P and BTR-15L Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs} and 
more T-54/55 tanks, the latter obviously because of shortfall s 
in the domestic production of Vijayanta tanks.56 
Czechoslovak derivatives of the BTR-50P, the OT-62/64, · 
were also imported57 and an agreement was reported to have 
been signed for their manufacture under licence in India. 58 
To strengthen the air defences, besides the manufacture 
of the L-70 AA guns, 40 Short Tigercat S-A systems, reported 
to have been ordered in October 1971, 59 were delivered by 
52 Military Balance 1971-72, p.46. 
53 Times of India, October 30, 1975. 
54 Jane's Weapons Systems 1978, p.850. 
55 Discussed in the chapter on Defence Production. 
56
· Military Balance 1972-73, p. 
57 ibid., p.48. 
58 SIPRI Yearbook 1972, p.332. 
59 SIPRI Yearbook 1972, p. 
• 
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April 197360 and the Army is also said to have taken 
delivery of ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled anti-aircraft 
guns sometime in 1977. 61 Besides these, the Army is 
also reported to possess SA-7 and SA-6 SAM's of Soviet 
. . b f. . . · 1 bl 62 origin ut no con irmation is avai a e. 
As far as armour is concerned, reports indicate that 
the Indian experience with the Vijayanta has been far 
from satisfactory. Although its domestic manufacture 
was taken up in an att'empt to achieve · self-sufficiency 
in tanks, the Vijayanta has reportedly not been able to 
live up to its specifications. Despite improvements 
performance of the engine did not meet requirements 63 
while the armour is also said to be defective. 64 This 
was brought out in the 1971 conflict where the Vijay~nta's 
were used as a second line of defence with the Soviet-built 
T·-sss being used in the front line. Despite unsatisfactory 
experience with the T-55 also, the tank showing a tendency 
to overheat under desert conditions, an unsuccessful 
60 Military Balance 1972-·73, p.78. 
61 Flight Interhntibhal, March 18, 1978. Also Military 
Balance ·19·70-79, p.61. 
62 Jane's Weapons Systems 1978, p.850. The 1977 edition 
(p.72) also mentioned that an agreement had originally 
been signed a few years ago for their manufacture under 
licence but which had since lapsed~ 
63 Kuldip Nayar in Ti·mes (London) , September 16, 1978. 
64
· International Defense· Review, 7/1978, p.1013. 
• 
attempt seems to have been made to mate the Vijayanta's 
105 mm gun with the T-55 chassis. 65 
38 
In February, 1978, the Defence Minister, Jagjivan 
Ram disclosed that a totally indigenous main battle tank 
was in an advanced stage of development at the Combat 
Vehicle Research Development Establishment, Madras. 66 
In the context of current re-equipment programs, not much 
significance can be attached to the above statement given 
India's reported decision to replace the Vijayanta T-55s 
and Centurions with an imported tank. An agreement for 
the initial supply of 70 Soviet T-72 tanks is said to 
have been signed early in 1978 67 and deliveries are expected 
to begin in 1979. 68 Recent reports, however, reveal that 
a 'limited number' of T-72s are being acquired only for 
evaluation purposes and that even the British Chieftain 
and German Leopard l are under consideration. 69 
Conclusion: 
Given the nature of land threats to the country, the 
expansion .modernisation of the Indian Army was obviously 
the first priority in Indian defence planning immediately 
65 'b'd l l • 
66 Reported in Over~eas Hindustan Times, February 23, 1978. 
Also, · International Defense Review, 3/1978, p. 306. 
67 International Defense Review, 2/1978, p.270 also 
Military Balance 1978-79, p.106. 
68 Refer n. 6 3. 
69 International Defense Rev~ew, 8/1978, p.1208. 
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after the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Manpower was no 
problem in the expansion program although some shortages 
of technically qualified personnel did persist for a few 
years. However, before the process could be completed 
the Army was involved in the war with Pakistan in 1965. 
Although not much information is available on this aspect, 
circumstantial evidence would suggest that the command 
and control structure still left much to be desired as 
well as the fact that much of the equipment at this stage, 
i.e. artillery armour and signals were obsolete and had 
yet to be replaced. 
The arms embargo by ·the Western powers delayed this 
process even further, but can be said to have had beneficial 
effects on the long run. This is because it gave India 
an added impetus to go in for indigenisation programs 
in order to enhance self reliance and lessen dependence 
on erratic external sources of supply. Also, as a consequence, 
the Soviet Union emerged as the primary supplier of artillery 
and armoured vehicles - the only equipment still being 
imported for the Army, India having attained self sufficiency 
in small arms and vehicles. 
· Nevertheless, the changeover in the sources of arms 
supply as well as delays in indigenous manufactqre of 
weapons did result in the fact that by the late 1960s, although 
all infantry units possessed arms of post-1960 design 
and manufacture, much had to be done by way of expansion 
and re-equipment of the artillery and armoured formations. 
This process can really be said to have got underway only 
• 
~o 
in the 1970s, although modest beginnings had been made 
earlier. Many of the tasks seem to have been fulfilled 
by the mid-1970s although there have been problems with 
the program of self reliance, for example the trouble 
with the Vijayanta and the eventual decision to replace 
them with imported tanks. 
Over the years, · especially as a result of experience 
gained in the 1965 ·and 1971 wars, substantial reorganisation 
of field formations and command structures have also taken 
place, presumably with beneficial results. Field formations 
have been streamlined and better organised with greater 
emphasis on mobility than before and the last few years 
have wi tness.ed further expansion of the Army. 
In other words, the Indian Army has come a long way 
from the ill-equipped force that it was at the time of 
the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 al~hough, instead of 
taking five years (1964-69) for the process, as originally 
envisaged in the Defence Plan, it required nearly a 
decade to really bring it up to the standards of a modern, 
well equipped force. 
• 
CHAPTER III 
INDI1\.N NAVY 1964-78 
Unlike the Army, development of the Indian Navy 
was not an effort which began only in the 1960s. 
Substantial expansion of Naval strength took place in 
41 
the 1955-61 period during which 4 'Ton' class coastal 
minesweepers, 2 'Whisky' class and 3 'Blackwood' anti-
submarine frigates, and 3 'Leopard' class anti-aircraft 
frigates were received from the United Kingdom. Furthermore, 
the Royal Navy's light fleet carrier HERCULES was purchased, 
modernised and commissioned in March 1961 as the INS VIKRANT. 1 
Thus, by the early 'sixties the Indian Navy 'had reached 
a stage when the operational fleet and training ships 
could be formed into two separate entities' , 2 although it 
was nowhere near having the strength and capabilities 
envisaged in the 10 year plan of naval expansion drawn up 
in 3 late 1947. 
The 1962 war and its aftermath resulted in a complete 
revision of priorities as far as military expansion was 
concerned. The defence plan (1964-69) made only a passing 
1 For a detailed account of the growth of the· Indian Navy 
during _the 1947-62 period see the chapter on 'The Indian 
Navy' in Lorne J. Kavic, India's Quest For Secur·i ty: Defence 
Policies: 1947-65 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Pres~, 1967), pp.116-125. 
2 Vice Admiral N. Krishnan, 'Indian Navy Since Independence', 
U.S.I. Journal, October-December 1970, p.406 . 
. 
3 This envisaged the gradual development of a task force 
comprising 2 aircraft carriers, 3 light cruisers, 8-9 
destroyers and the necessary support ships. See Lorne Kavic, 
p.117. 
__.. 
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reference to naval requirements in that the Navy would be 
'maintained at its present strength' and envisaged the 
'replacement of older ships by modern vessels' a.s also 
the acquisition of a submarine and 'certain other vessels' 
as part of this program. 4 Much has been made of this 
hiatus in naval expansion from 1962 to about 1967 by 
observers, both official and unofficial. Vice Admiral 
N. Krishnan maintained that the 1962-66 period was a 
lean one for the Navy as emphasis was laid on modernisation 
and expansion of the Army and the Air Force and it was only 
after 1967 that the 'Naval Planners could see their way 
clear for the next phase of the modernisation of the fleet•. 5 
Another writer views the situation upto 1971 in two 
phases: (a) 1962-65, when the Navy was largely neglected 
except for verbal assurances from the Defence Ministry and 
(b) 1965-71, when the pro-Navy forces became more assertive 
and, as a consequence 'modest beginnings were then made 
to rearm the Navy'. 6 
It is not to be denied that building up a Navy is a 
far more capital intensive and expensive task than would 
be the case with the Army or the Air Force, but then, most 
of the purchases from abroad under the first National Defence 
Plan, whether from the Soviet Union or from the West, were 
made under loan agreements. Hence, it could be argued that 
4 India. Ministry of Defence Report 1964-65, p.35. 
Hereafter cited as the Report. 
5 Refer n.2. 
6 Raju G.C. Thomas, 'The Politics of Indian Naval Re-
Armament, 1962-1974', Pacific Community, Vol.6, No.3, April 
1975, p.457. 
4 
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the Navy did not expand during this period not because of 
its neglect by the policy-makers but by the lack of 
availability not only of ships but also of finance. 
However, before pursuing this line of argument further, 
it is essential to consider the threat-perception that 
lay behind the development of the Indian Navy in the 1950s. 
It has been aptly observed that the Indian Government 
saw the Navy as an 'implicit part of a Corrunonwealth-United 
States naval defence of the lines of corrununication' 
although it had no desire to get involved in any East-West 
conflict. This was probably because of India's depend~nce 
on maritime-borne commerce with the West but the ' ••. Navy's 
operational planning during the period 1947-62, however, 
seems to have contemplated operations, if at all, only 
• k • I 7 against Pa istan ... 
Also, during this period there seems to have been ample 
evidence of the government's reluctance to allocate funds 
for refits, maintenance and repairs of ships or for the 
development of adequa·te docking and repair facilities. 8 
On the other hand, this can be attributed to poor planning 
by the Navy since given limited resources it tended to 
overlook the development of an adequate infrastructure 
to support naval deployments, in its haste to acquire more 
ships. There was also a · continuous shortage of qualified 
personnel, both officers and technicians, which put 'a great 
7 Lorne J. Kavic, p.123. 
8 ibid., pp.124-125. 
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deal of strain on the manning situation•. 9 But, despite 
the fact that the government was more conscious of the 
threat on the land frontiers, the Navy does seem to have 
been able to produce a somewhat credible case for naval 
expansion. 
'1 4 
As early as 1963, the government was said to have 
accepted the necessity of a submarine fleet10 and during 
his visit to the United Kingdom in 1964, besides other 
equipment, the Defence Minister was reported to have been 
interested in acquiring 3 frigates, 3 destroyers, a 
submarine and a couple of minesweepers 11 having earlier 
told the Parliament about the 'vast program' for the 
replacement of overage ships. 12 This was shortly after 
his visit to the United States where ' ... it was agreed 
that • • • requirements in this field should first be discussed 
with the British government' and to the Soviet Union where 
9 Vice Admiral N. Krishnan. Refer n.2, p.406. This is 
primarily because of a regulation that officers and men 
for a new ship could be recruited only after she had been 
commissioned. The rule has since been changed. 
lO f . . h . 1 · t d De ence Minister Y.B. Cavan in Par iament as repor e 
in Times of India, April 30, 1963. This was also mentioned 
in the naval review released on December 31, 1963 which ~l so 
listed additional commitments undertaken by the Indian Navy 
like setting up of garrisons in the Andaman and Nicoba~ 
islands and preparations to take over coastal batteries 
(from the Army) strengthening of the aviation wing and 
setting up of new bases. See Asian 'Recorder, 1964, 
5630:INI:A. 
11 K. C. Khanna in Times· of India, November 15, 19 6 4. 
12 Quoted in Times (London) , September 22, 19.64. 
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the' ... authorities provided facilities ... to see the 
performance of the naval craft including submarines which 
they (are) in a position to supply to India •.• 113 
Consequently, the attempt at acquiring British ships was 
a reflection of the pro-West bias that prevailed among the 
Defence establishment14 but the visit was only marginally 
successful. The British authorities pointed out that it 
would not be possible for them to release the ships from 
their operational reserve but gave an assurance that the 
Indian ' . .. request would be considered in the light of 
the review of their defence policy which they were currently 
engaged in'. They also' ... indicated their willingness 
to provide facilities to enable ... (India) .•. to place 
an order for a ... submarine ••. ' However, Chavan went 
on to say that a final decision could only be taken after 
details of the assistance that could be made available 
by the British was settled. 15 In the interirn, the United 
Kingdom was reported to have agreed to provide India with 
a submarine for 2 to 3 months each year for a few years 
f . . . 16 h l h. . or training purposes. Hence, t eon y ac ievement in 
13 Statement in Parliament on September 21, 1964, quoted 
in Asian Recorder, 1964, 6100:INI:A. 
14 This point has been stressed by many writers. Later, 
' ... the decision to move away from a predominantly British-
oriented to . a more Soviet-oriented fleet .•. met with 
considerable opposition at Naval Headquarters'. Raju G.C. 
Thomas, 'The Indian Navy in the Seventies', Pacific Affairs, 
Vol.48, No.4, Winter 1975-76, p.502. See also Ian Clark, 
'Autonomy and Dependence in Recent Indo-Soviet Relations', 
Australian Outlook, Vol.31, No.l, April 1977, p.153. 
15 'b'd i i • 
16 Chavan's statement, as reported in the New ·ycrk Times, 
November 27, 1964. 
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terms of naval modernisation was the agreement for a 
loan of E4.7 million for the modernisation and expansion 
of the Mazagon Docks and the construction, under licence 
of 3 Leander Class frigates. 17 
Thus, by the end of 1964, efforts for naval 
modernisation were well underway, despite the lack of 
obvious success. The government claimed to have offers 
for the supply of submarines both from the United Kingdom 
and theSoviet Union although a decision could be taken only 
after' ... fully considering the financial implications 
and other factors' . 18 Other infrastructural measures 
had also been initiated. Steps were being taken to provide 
the Indian Navy with a fleet replenishment tanker. A 
naval air station (INS HANSA) was established at Dabolim 
(Goa) consequent on the purchase of 6 Sea Hawks from U.K. 
Manning of Coastal batteries was transferred to the Navy 
from the Army. Further expansion of the naval base (INS 
JARAWA) at Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands 
was sanctioned. A Central Designs Organisation was set up 
at the Naval Headquarters to undertake ships design work. 19 
Nothing of any significance could be achieved in the 
first half of 1966 either, as discussions with the U.K. 
about submarine acquisition stalled, reportedly on the 
17 . b. d l l • 
18 Emphasis added. Chavan's statement in Parliament on 
November 30, 1964, as reported in· Times· of India, December 1, 
1964. See also Times, December 1, 1964. The Soviet offer 
also included the supply of 'other ships'. 
19 Report 1964-65, pp.35-38. 
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problem of finance. 20 Hence, it was only in August that 
a delegation left for .Moscow to negotiate the purchase of 
naval vessels from the Soviet Union - a deal which had 
already been agreed to, in principle. 21 While disclosing 
no details, the signing of an agreement was formally 
announced in Parliament by Defence Minister Chavan on 
6 Septernber. 22 Soviet experts would also help plan a 
new east coast shipyard at Vishakapatnam and the deal 
was reported to include the purchase of four submarines, 
'a number' of missi1e boats, patrol craft and landing 
23 . 
craft. Not only had the first steps towards naval 
expansion and modernisation been taken but also this was 
the first time that the Indian Navy was set to acquire 
vessels .from a country other than the United Kingdom. 24 
After the 1965 Inda-Pakistan war emphasis on the · 
maritime aspects of Indian defence increased. 25 Before 
this, naval debate tended to make vague references to 
20 Times, August 4, 1965. 
21 Straits Times (Singapore), Augusf 16, .1965. 
22 Keesings Contemporary Archives 1965-66, 21036C. 
23 Age (Melbourne), November 24, 1965. 
24 On this question ~here was reported to have been some 
worry in London about the security aspect of the exchange 
of naval information, but it was pointed out that India was 
already receiving Soviet aircraft and other material, and 
military information from one country was not passed on to 
another. See Times, August 6, 1965. 
25 For example a report in Times of India, January 13, 1969, 
stated that the Navy' ... got attention following the 1965 
conflict with Pakistan and ... secured a place in the 
plan which was reframed at a higher outlay ... to run from 
1966 to 1971 ... ' 
• 
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Indian 'maritime interests' in the Indian Ocean, but the 
war and subsequent events brought into focus two 
significant aspects. Firstly, the ineffectual performance 
of the Navy during the hostilities, in which no naval 
action was undertaken except that the Indian Navy .•. 
ensured the safety of • • • ports and coastline ..• 
126 
And secondly, the decision by Pakistan and Indonesia to 
hold joint naval exercises. Naval planners, upto now 
accustomed to perceiving a naval threat . from Pakistan, 
and to some extent from China, now had a new force to 
reckon with, although this factor was officially underplayed. 27 
Nevertheless, official naval statements tended to 
become more specific, The Naval Chief, Vice Admiral A.K. 
Chatterji, speaking at Enarkulam on May 26, 1966, not only 
mentioned the proposals to acquire new warship~ each year 
~ 
from then on, but also spoke of proposals for a new aircraft 
carrier and a program for the replacement of Sea Hawks. 28 
26
· Report 1965-66, p. 22. This would necessarily have been 
not only because Pakistan had acquired a submarine in 1964 
(see Dawn, March 1, 1964) to counter which India had only 
overage vessels but also because the Navy was nearly one 
third short of its requirements for officers and men. 
so' 
27 For example, speaking in Parliament on November 29, 1965, 
Defence Minister Chavan said that the government did' ... not 
attach premature significance to this matter as to create 
any imaginary difficulties'. Quoted in Times of India, 
November 30, 1965. 
28 Report in Asian Recorder 1966, 7156:INI:Q. The need for 
two naval task forces with aircraft carriers forming the 
nucleus was also underlined by other senior Naval officers, 
like Rear Admiral B.A. Samson (see, Times of India, June 2, 
1966) and also received support by the Indian press. 
E.G. Editorial in Times of India, March 25, 1966. A few 
months earlier, speaking on the occasion of a naval review, 
President S. Radhakrishnan had stressed the need for sufficient 
number of submarines and naval aircraft to help defend the 
country. Reported in Times of India, February 11, 1966. 
.. 
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A few wee~s later, Vice Admiral Chatterji elaborated 
further and spoke of the government's approval of 
development plans for the Navy on 'the more modern lines', 
that the Defence Minister was a 'Navy minded' man and the 
government was diverting its full attention now towards 
29 . 
the Navy and the massive development program would 
enable it to have two fleets. 30 
The Ministry of Defence Report for 1965-66 also 
stressed the efforts being made to expand naval 
establishments e.g. the Naval Dockyard Expansion Scheme 
at Bombay, and a report was to be prepared for the construction 
of a new dockyard at Vishakapatnam. Establishment of a 
naval base at Marinagao (Goa) and repair facilities at 
Port Blair were under consideration and efforts were being 
made to procure aircraft replacements for the VIKRANT. 31 
Further efforts in this direction continued in 1966-67; 
apart from fighting vessels, two medium LSTs from the Soviet 
Union also joined the fleet and the keels of 3 Seaward 
Defence Boats were laid at Garden Reach Workshops, Calcutta. 
29 As reported in Times of India, June 28, 1966. 
30 Times of India, July 1, 1966. 
31 Report 1965-66, pp.23-24. The submarine acquisition 
program, however, seems to have run into some difficulties 
during this period. Vice Admiral Soman was reported to 
have said (February 2) that no appreciable advance had been 
made in the matter of acquiring submarines. Despite the 
fact that an agreement on submarine purchase had already been 
signed Vice Admiral Chatterji was quoted as saying 'We are 
also trying to get submarines (see Asian Recorder 1966, 6964: 
INI:T and 7156:INI:Q). But this could also have been 
because of unwillingness by the Navy to accept Soviet 
equipment and attempts to seek them from the West. 
.. 
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Steps were taken to further improve facilities at the 
Naval Air Station D~bolim and an increase in the strength 
. . d . 32 
of the Naval Air Arm was under consi eration. 
Naval arguments in favour of expansion developed 
further. Indigenous efforts at shipbuilding were emphasised 
and the Naval Chief now felt that India 'could acquire 
smaller vessels as carriers like Vikrant would cost a 
lot•. 33 The concept of a two fleet Navy received support 
in Parliament 34 and continued to be pushed by the Navy 
as the Chief of N~val Staff visited the Soviet Union for 
h f · · h. 35 h. 1 . t e purpose o acquiring more wars ips. W i e it was 
conceded that there was little danger of a ·major invasion 
of the mainland the strategic importance of, as well as 
potential threats, to the offshore islands of Andaman, 
Nicobar and Laccadives from the Indonesian and Pakistan 
Navies were particularly emphasised. As a major innovation 
in this debate, reference was made to the growth of India's 
merchant shipping and stress was laid on the fact that the 
Navy should grow along with it, 36 that naval exercises 
underlined the need for replacing some of the destroyers 
3 2 
· Report 19 6 6 - 6 7 , pp . 2 4- 2 5 . 
33 Vice Admiral Chatterji quoted i~ Times of India, 
November 1, 1966. 
34 Refer Asian Recorder 1967, 7835-6 :INI :N. See also 
Times of India, June 27, 1967. 
35 Statement of Vice Admiral Chatterji quoted in· Times of 
India, September 29, 1967. 
36 Ch~tterji's speech as reported in Times of India, 
September 3, 1967. 
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'which had become extremely outdated. 37 One analyst 
advanced the concept of 'forward strategy' which involved 
... mounting of guard on enemy naval 
bases, initiation of electronic warfare on 
the naval communication system of the enemy, 
harassing the enemy's supply lines with 
submarine and anti-submarine operations and 
finally engaging naval forces of the enemy 
in battle at a time and place of its own 
choosing.38 
Some writers emphasised the fact that India, until the 
advent of the Muslims, had always been a maritime power 
and that subsequent neglect had r~sulted in colonisation, 39 
while others, arguing from a .more contemporary perspective, 
stressed the need for a stronger Indian naval presence in 
the Indian Ocean in order to establish a military balance of 
power as well as to counteract Chinese and Pakistani influence, 
especially after the British ~ithdrawai. 40 
The latter point was perhaps overemphasised by Admiral 
h · · 41 h k. . 1 d . rob C atterJi w o, spea ing at a ceremonia para e in Bo ay 
37 Times of India, October 11, 1967. 
38 Bikash B. Basu, 'Military Evaluation of Seas and Oceans 
and the Geographic Basis of Sea Power•, · U.S.I. Journal, 
October-December 1967, p.369. 
39 Maj. Gen. Har Prasad, 'India - An Old Maritime Power', 
U.S.I. Journal, October-December 1967, pp.335-340. 
40 E.g. K. Subrahmanyam, 'Ebb and Flow of Power in the 
Indian Ocean Area', U.S.I. Journal, January-March 1968, 
pp.3-16. Also, Capt. N.P. Datta,I.N., · 'The Vacuum and All 
That', U.S.I. Journal, April-June 1969, pp.105-112. For 
an article emphasising the role of submarines see 
Lt. Vishnu Bhagat, I.N., 'The Contribution of the Submarines 
to the American Victory in the Pacific', · U.S.T. Journal, 
January-March 1967, pp.65-74. 
41 k · . h h - . . h f h In eeping wit t e ongoing expansion, t e post o t e 
Naval Chief was upgraded to the rank of an Admiral w.e.f. 
March 1, 1968. 
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in March 1968 is reported to have said that the Indian 
Navy would be in complete charge of the Indian Ocean with 
the withdrawal of the British fleet in 1971. 42 Speaking 
a month after the visit of the Soviet Naval Chief, Admiral 
Gorshkov, he added that the Navy would acquire more ships 
and recruit more men - with most of the new equipment 
. f h . . 43 corning rorn t e Soviet Union. 
Consequently, as a result of ongoing efforts over 
the last several years, the Indian Navy can be said to 
have 'come of age' only from rnid-1968 onwards. The first 
of the Soviet built 'F' class submarine INS KALVERI 
joined the Navy in July, 1968, and another4 INS KHANDARI 
was commissioned at the Soviet base in Riga in December. 
Two Commands were formed - the Western Fleet with headquarters 
at Bombay and the Eastern Fleet based at Vishakapatnarn. 
It was also announced that the naval base at Goa would be 
upgraded and expanded to the level of that at Cochin. Two 
Petya-class des±:royer escorts ('INS KAMOTRA and KADMATH) 
joined the Navy in 1969. 44 A submarine depot ship (INS AMBA) 
was also acquired in 1969, and a helicopter squad~on 
(composed .of Al-IIIs) was formed at Goa to meet the logistics 
42 As reported in Times, March 4, 1968. 
43 'b'd i i • 
44 For documentation of these details see Raju G.C. THornas, 
n.6, pp.464-465. INS KHANDARI and the depot ship INS AMBA 
actually joined the Indian Navy on June 1, 1969. See 
Times of India, June 2, 1969. 
53 
and Air Sea Rescue requirements of the Navy. 45 
Construction of the Naval Dockyard at Vishakapatnam began 
in August, 1969 and new training establishments at Goa, 
Cochin and Lake Chilka (Orissa) 46 were set up to cater to 
increased manpower requirements. 
It was also during 1969 that the long-drawn debate 
about the second aircraft carrier ended when it was 
officially announced that 
For reasons of economy ... it has been 
decided to give up the idea 0£ acquiring 
a second carrier and to arrange for suitable 
means of providing the necessary aerial support 
for the Navy. This would be done by 
developing facilities in the island 47 territories and ports like Vishakapatnam. 
The problem of maritime defence was also more clearly 
enunciated in the context of (1) a large coastline; 
(2) island territories; (3) dependence on the sea as a 
means of communication - ever increasing mercantile marine 
requiring protection, and (4) development and augmentation 
of the submarine arm by Pakistan. 48 
This period can thus be considered as the begi nning 
of the process of systematic planning and an improvement 
on the halting and hesitant nature of naval procurement 
45 Report 1969-70, pp.24-25. 
46 ibid. , p. 2 7. 
47 ibid., p.25. 
48 ibid., p.23. 
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that the earlier years had witnessed. 49 There was also a 
change in the composition of ship types as much smaller 
ships i.e. PETYA Class destroyer escorts and OSA Class 
patrol boats with emphasis on missiles and speed joined 
the fleet. This was in sharp contrast with the 
conventional armament aboard the older destroyers and 
frigates of British origin. 50 The submarine wing was also 
strengthened with the acquisition of the third (INS KARAN!) 
and fourth (INS KURSURA) 
· 52 May 1970 respectively. 
b . . b 51 d su marines in Fe ruary an 
To improve the range and 
effectiveness of anti-submarine operations, a Sea King ASW 
Helicopter Squadron (INAS 330) was sanctioned, and became 
operational in April 1971. 53 
In 1969-70, a new naval plan for the 1970s was also 
drawn up. While a balanced fleet of ships, submarines, 
49 For example, the decision to buy OSA Class missile boats 
was taken only after the Israeli ship EILAT had been sunk 
by Soviet supplied missile boats of the UAR which India 
could have purchased as early as 1965. See. K. Subrahmanyam 
in Times bf India, August 4, 1970. 
50 There were, however, some reports that the Indian Navy 
was dissatisfied with Soviet vessels because of poor 
workmanship. According to Time·s of India (August 11, 1970) 
quoting a Daily Telegraph report, negotiations were in 
progress for the pu_rchase of a number of British bui.l t 
frigates, which, according to Indian sources in London, 
was nothing new as the 'Indian Navy had always bought ships 
from Britain'. It appeared that 2 PETYA Class vessels 
manned by Indian officers had been forced to seek help 
from the Royal Navy at Hong Kong for repairs, while on 
passage from Vladivostok to Vishakapatnam! 
51 Times of India, February 7, 1970. 
52 Age, May 14, 1970. 
53 Statesman (Overseas), April 8, 1971. Also Times of India, 
April 18, 1971. 
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and naval aircraft was ac~ieved under the first (1960s) 
plan, the second plan envisaged' ... optimum use of ... 
existing ships and their phased replacement by the Leander 
class 54 An important feature of the Plan • • • (was) • • • • 
... a greater reliance on indigenous construction in 
future so as to eliminate ... dependence on purchase of 
ships from abroad . . . also ... the buildup ,of necessary 
infrastructure in the country for shipbuilding and logistic 
facilities for the support of ., .. (the) expanding fleet•. 55 
Although the necessity of de~ign collaboration in the ship 
construction program was recognised, a beginning was made 
with the setting up of a new Directorate of Naval Design. 56 
Also, the pressure on resources had eased somewhat 
and since the buildup and reequipment of an 825,000 strong 
Army had been completed more funds could be diverted to 
the Air Force and Navy. Political support for the Navy 
had also increased as the Government grew more conscious 
of the increasing significance of Indian maritime interestsF 57 
54 In addition to the 3 already under construction, further 
orders for 3 more Leander Class frigates were placed in June 
19 70. Refer Report ·of the Comptroller and A.udi tor General of 
India i976. Part V. Mazago~ Dock Limited, 1977, p.22. 
55 Report 1970-71, p.22. 
5 6 ibid. , p. 2 4. 
57 For instance in their Navy Day messages (1970), President 
V.V. Giri emphasised that' ... with the rapid growth in the 
development of anval armament throughout the world, the task 
of our Navy assumes greater significance', Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi called attention to the challenge facing the 
Navy and the opportunities open to it in view of the 
rediscovery by military thinking of the strategic and operational 
advantages of the sea, while Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram 
stressed that the Navy was being strengthened and modernised 
in recognition of its responsibility for the defence of 'this 
vast country and its island territories' and 'our growing 
maritime trade'. See Times of India, December 15, 1970. 
56 
particularly in view of Pakistan's acquisition of maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft and submarines. 58 Emphasis tended 
to be given to a naval fleet composed of Leander frigates, 
supported by smaller, Soviet-supplied naval craft as 
the ideal type for maritime defence of Indian coastlines 
and offshore islands. 59 Although, initially this trend 
developed for financial reasons, 60 and probably due to 
lack of suppliers other than the Soviet Union, it received 
further impetus after the 1971 war ·with Pakistan, in which 
the small missile boats performed well. This line of naval 
development obviously was not welcomed by senior naval - · 
officers, and arguments not only in favour of large ships 
but particularly in the· support of aircraft carriers/Air 
Control Ships (ACS) were advanced. Without effective 
air cover it was said, establishing effective control 
of the seas would not be possible. On the other hand ACS 
carrying a mix of ASW helicopters and V/STOL aircraft, 
would enhance the striking power of the Navy. 61 
The 1971 war was a watershed in another way too. 
The average of the naval vessels was too high. The Navy's 
58 d' · h' f ·1· k · ( mb For a iscussion on tis re er to Di ip Mu erJee Nave er · 
21, 1970) and Inder Malhotra (September 17, 1971) in 
Times of India. 
59 .b.d l l • 
60 This was officially acknowledged too. The Ministry of 
Defence Report ·1971·-72 stated that' ... exigencies of the 
financial situation, coupled with the cost of modern warships, 
impose constraints on our capacity to develop the Indian 
Navy to meet all its inescapable obligations fully' (p.56). 
61 Admiral A.K. Chatterji in Times of India, December 4, 1972. 
57 
successful performance in the war despite these handicaps 
brought greater attention to bear on its requirements. 
The government approved the expansion of the submarine 
arm and it was decided that in future, all ships of the 
size of frigate and above would 'carry some type of 
aircraft'. 62 The question of replacements for Sea Hawks 
and acquisition of long range anti-submarine aircraft 
assumed importance. 63 The war also' ... brought into focus 
the deficiencies ~··' and in view of the ' . ... emerging 
situation in the Indian Ocean ... ' the ' •.. plans and 
priorities for Naval re~quipment as provided in the Naval 
Roll-on Plan 1970-75 ... ' were readjusted. 64 This process 
continued during 1973 when it was also made clear that 
modernisation and augmentation of fleet units would continue 
. . . d . h . f ' '65 espite t e constraints o resources ... 
As mentioned earlier, the resource constraint, specially 
in terms of foreign exchange had spurted Indian attempts 
to go in for indigenous construction of warships and 
submarines. Negotiations on collaboration with the West 
in the manufacture of patrol boats were underway as early 
as 1969 after similar plans for collaboration with the Soviet 
62 h · d . . . ff t t. Tis ecision was, in e ec , a very pragma ic one given 
the fact · that no funds were forthcoming for aircraft/ 
helicopter carriers. 
63 See statement of Naval Chief Admiral S.M. Nanda as 
reported in Times of India, November 22, 1972. 
64
· Report 1972-73, p.30. 
65 Report l973-74, p.29. Emphasis added. 
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Union (OSA Class?) had reportedly failed to materialise. 66 · 
In 1970, the Deputy Minister for Defence Production 
P.C. Sethi, had stated in Parliament that the proposal 
to manufacture submarines with foreign collaboration was 
b · · 1 ·d d 67 eing active y consi ere. Little or no headway seems 
to have been made, because two years later, the Defence 
Minister, Jagjivan Ram, was still speaking of establishing 
the production of submarines 'soon•. 68 While in 1974, 
the Minister for Defence Production, V.C. Shukla, announced 
that the possible use of nuclear propulsion for submarines 
was under study. 69 After unsuccessful negotiations with 
the Soviet Union, India was reported to have come close 
to signing an agreement with Sweden for the indigenous 
manufacture of the Al4 class submarines, 70 but this too . 
did not materialise. 
Talks for the manufacture of corvettes also seem to 
have begun in the late 1960s or early 1970s, initially 
. h h . . 71 wit t e Soviet Union. In 1972 the Chief of Naval Staff, 
Admiral Nanda disclosed that the choosing of a design for 
their manufacture was in the final stage. 72 In 1974, it 
was reported that the Mazagon Dock Ltd. was negotiating 
66
· Times of India, October 6, 1969. 
67 Reported in Times of India, September 7, 1970. 
68
· Times of India, Octobe~ 6, 1972. 
69 P.C. Tandon in Times ·of India, June 26, 1974. 
70 International Defense Review, 4/1974, p.530. 
71 
. . kh . d 1 . 1 Ravi Ri ye in Arme Forces Journa Internationa, 
March 1975, p.14. · 
72 Times of India, October 29, 1972. 
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air agreement with France for the licenced production 
of an initial order of 25-30 of the new Type A69 Avisos 73 
but this venture has not been successful so far and, as a 
consequence, 8 Nanuchka class corvettes were ordered 
f th . . . 74 rom e Soviet Union. 
Although it emerged as the primary supplier of naval 
equipment, the Soviet Union seems to have been unwilling 
to ente~ into collaboration agreements with India on naval 
construction, unlike its policy on aircraft manufacture. 
This can perhaps be interpreted as an attempt, albeit 
unsuccessful, to ensure dependence, for it has also been 
reported that, after the 1971 war, the Soviets held up 
spare part shipments to India and later began refusing to 
deliver advanced equipment. 75 This is presumably one of 
the reasons why India decided to take up the indigenous 
manufacture of spares and other items for ships of Soviet 
origin 'on a planned basis 176 and sought collaboration 
agreements with the West. For despite the recent agreement 
for the supply of 2 KASHIN Class destroyers to India, 77 
it is important to note that Sea Harriers instead of the 
73 International Defense Review, 7/1974, p.671. 
74 International Defense Review, 4/1976·, p.535. 
75 Ravi Rikhye. ·Refer n. 71. 
76 Report 1971-72, p.59. 
77 Military Balance· 1978-79, p.106. Also SIPRI Yearbook 
1978, p.262. 
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Soviet Yakovlev STOL have been chosen to replace the ~gi~g 
Sky Hawks 78 and a decision on the outright purchase of 
licence and technology for manufacturing submarines (which 
is reported to be 'very close to finalisation') will be 
made from among 4 West European contenders - Holland, 
. 79 Sweden, France and West Germany. 
It can thus be inferred that the Navy did assume 
greater s .ignificance in defence planning particularly 
after the 19 71 war. Paradoxically, this o·ccurred at a time 
when the threat from Pakistan diminished in that the Navy 
no longer had the task of disrupting sea links between 
East and West Pakistan. 
of Port Blair (And~mans) 
Nonetheless, the development 
80 
as an advanced naval base was 
approved in 1972-73 on the grounds that it would' ... serve 
as a focal point for the defence of ... (the) ... eastern 
coasts and for protection of (Indian) .•. trade with the 
Far East'. 81 Other reasons .given for strengthening the 
'defence' of these islands include protection of (a) mineral 
78 ibid. Although performance characteristics must have been 
responsible for this decision, it should be noted that 
some years ago the Indian Navy was said to have been favouring 
the Yakovlev over the Sea Harrier. See Henry Stanhope in 
The Times, January 4, 1974. And Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), January 4, 1974. 
79 Subhash Chakravarti in Times of India, January 10, 1978. 
This decision is said to have resulted in a Soviet offer 
to convert India's existing submarine fleet to nuclear 
propulsion. Rear Admiral Yasenkov while .on a visit to Bombay 
is reportedly said that the Soviet Union would be willing to 
share its experience in the field of nuclear propulsion with 
India. See Tnternation·a1· Defen·se Review, 2/1978, p.148. 
80 1 . 1 b . Pans inc ude a ase repair 
an approximate cost of Rs.15.3 
be commissioned in March 1978. 
81 Report 1972-73, p.32. 
organisation being set up at 
million and was expected to 
See· Report 1977-78, p.23. 
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and other resources (which are yet unknown) ; 82 (b) exclusive 
economic zone which has witnessed poaching by Thai and. 
Taiwanese trawlers and lastly, some degree of concern about 
neighbouring countries (i.e. Thailand? Malaysia? Indonesia?) 
.' getting overpopulated and known to be acquirin·g more 
sophisticated naval capabilities than those which India 
has for the defence of these islands'. 83 A unified 
command structure comprising the three services i.e. Army, 
Navy and Air Force has been established and communication 
links have been established right through the island chain -
from North Andaman to Great Nicobar. 84 
The creation of an Eastern Fleet along with the defence 
needs of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands have given an added 
significance to the port of Vishakapatnam, which, when 
developed would be the biggest in Asia. Strategically located 
mid-way between Madras and Calcutta,development of this base 
originally began soon after the acquisition of ships from 
the Soviet Union with all the attendant need for security 
as between the existing Western naval equipment and the new 
Soviet arrivals. While repair and other facilities for 
82 Offshore drilling has begun only at one point so far 
and more is to follow. 
83 Sivadas Banerjee in Times of India, April 15, 1978. 
Located 1,300 km. east of the Indian Mainland the 350 island 
archipelago covers an area of over 8,000 km. stretching 
from a point 650 km. of the Burmese coast in the north to 
Pygmalion Point on Great Nicobar, which is about 150 km. 
from the northern tip of Sumatra (Indonesia). 
84 S. Dharmarajan in Times of India, December 30, 1976. 
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Western and indigenously produced ships exist in Bornbay, 85 
Vishakapatnam caters to vessels of Soviet origin . l.. e. 'F' 
class submarines, PETYA Class escorts, . OSA Patrol Boats 
and includes a submarine base (INS VIRBAHU) which was 
commissioned in May 1971 86 as well as a submarine training 
87 
school (INS SATAVAHANA). 
Besides these, the Navy was also able to resolve a 
long standing inter-service debate with the Air Force on 
the question of maritime reconnaissance. The Navy had for 
long been trying to take over this job which had hitherto 
been performed by the Air Force using obsolete Super 
Constellations acquired from Air India, as well as get . 
approval for the acquisi tiion of long range anti-subrnarine 
aircraft, proposals for which were reported to have been 
submitted in 1974. 88 There was opposition to this by the 
Air Force - on grounds of operational efficiency in the 
first case, and because of its more pressing need for . 
replacement of bombers in the second instance. The debate 
seems to have moved in favour of the Navy in 1975 when the 
Government is reported to have agreed to allow the Navy 
85 These are being moderoised and expanded at a total cost 
of over Rs.500 million and are expected to be commissioned 
by 1985. There are also plans to construct what would be 
the largest dry dock in the country at a cost of Rs.150 
million. · See Anita Katyal in Times of India, December 9, 
19 77. 
86 Times of India, December 4, 1972. 
87 Times of India, April 19, 1976. 
88 Sudarshan Bhatia in Times of India, February 2, 1974. 
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to control maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine 
operations and sanction the purchase of IL-38 ASW aircraft 
from the Soviet Union. 89 Formal approval was, however, 
given only in October 1976, and by October 1977, the Navy 
had acquired 3 IL-38 MR/ASW a·ircraft90 with 2 more 
91 
reportedly on order. In .fact, 1975-77 seem to have been 
the most productive years insofar as the Navy is concerned, 
for besides the IL-38s, orders have been placed for: 
8 'Osa 65', 8 'Nanuchka', 2 'Kashin', 5 Ka-25 Hormone ASW 
helicopters, 92 SSN-11, 84 SSN-2, 144 SSN-9 missiles from 
the Soviet Union and 8 Sea Harriers and 5 Sea King ASW 
Helicopters from the United Kingdom. 92 
~his steady improvement in the fortunes of the Navy 
has been a result of many arguments that have successfully 
been 'sold' to the policy makers, including that relating 
to the fact developing offshore oil and mineral resources 
and' ... the impact of the changing maritime laws as a 
sequel to deliberations in the Law of the Sea Confe rences•. 93 
But, one significant factor which seems to have acquired 
great importance insofar as the naval threat perception 
was concerned is Iran's naval procurement program. For 
89 Statesman, May .29, 1975. See also Statesman Weekly, 
May 31, 1975. 
9 O ·Report 19 7 7 - 7 8 , p . 21 . 
91 Military Balance 19.78-79, p.106. 
92 ibid. Also SIPRI Yearbook 1978, pp.262-263. 
93 Report l976-77, p.18. 
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example, the Ministry of Defence Report 1975-76 stressed 
the necessity of keeping a 'watchful eye' on ' •.. naval 
developments in the littoral states which are acquiring 
most modern and sophisticated ships and aircraft .•• 194 
In a continuation of this trend and to relieve the 
Navy from strictly coastal and enforcement tasks an 
interim Coast Guard Organisation was set up from February 1, 
1977, 95 and it formally became the latest addition to the 
Indian para-military forces in .August 1978 when a bill 
was passed by Parliament. 96 Headed by a former naval 
officer, Vice Admiral V.A. Karnath, it is expected to 
concentrate on policing and protection of offshore 
installations, Indian fishing interests and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, and organise anti-pollution and anti-
smuggling measu·res. A 15-year plan for its development is 
reported to have been submitted and during the next 6 
years is proposed to spend Rs.l billion in expanding and 
t th . h . . 97 s reng ening t e organisation. 
Conclusions: 
As can be construed from the foregoing analysis, the 
Naval modernisation and expansion program took a few years 
to get underway after overall defence expansion began in 
94 Report 1976-77, p.18. 
95 Overseas Hindustan· Times, April 13, 1978. 
96 Overseas Hindustan Times, August 31, 1978. 
97 'b' d 
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1964. While the question of finance did have a significant 
role, the fact remains that the availability of ships from 
the conventional source, i.e. United Kingdom, was also a 
problem. Besides, not much attention seems to have been 
devoted in the early years to the development of strategic 
goals as well as infrastructural capabilities. 
This situation changed after the 1965 war with Pakistan 
when the prospect of a naval confrontation with the latter, 
possibly in alliance with Indonesia and even China did not 
appear so unreal. Although the Indonesian threat declined 
in the years that followed 98 there was the simultaneous 
development of a new source of supply of naval vessels -
the . soviet Union: Though the Navy still had to compete 
for funds with the sister services, it can by no means be 
asserted that such funds were not forthcoming. 
Unlike the 1950s, the emphasis now shifted to the 
development of a submarine wing as well as an ASW capability -
the latter because of the acquisition of submarines by 
Pakistan. As far as surface vessel were concerned, stress 
1 . d 11 f . · · 1 9 9 was ai on sma , ast moving m1ss1 e boats. In 
other words, with the exception of the older vessels 
(including VIKRANT) the 'new' Navy was essentially a 
defensive one with its submarines providing limited offensive 
capability. Substantial investment was made in the 
Government owned shipyards and facilities created for the 
98 How far this was a product of Indian naval thinking as 
against the fact that the only source for the Navy could 
supply only these types is, however, a debatable point. 
99 
. d . h t f . Discusse in Cap er on De ence Production. 
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production of ancillary vessels and coastal patrol boats 
100 for the Navy. 
The 1971 war proved to be a watershed as far as the 
fortunes of the Indian Navy were concerned. Despite the 
fact that all of its larger vessels as also its aircraft 
were over age, it put up a good performance thereby 
convincing the decision makers of the need to pay greater 
attention to this relatively neglected branch of the armed 
forces. This was also the phase when the debate about 
the relative utility of large surface ships began. It 
still continues. Opponents argued that not only are they 
too expensive to purchase but unnecessary, given India's 
strategic requirements. This argument has been strengthened 
after the creation of Bangladesh when the Indian Navy is 
no longer faced with the task of disrupting lines of 
communication between East and West Pakistan. Also, the 
performance of the small and relatively fast missile patrol 
boats gives added impetus to their arguments. 
Supporters of the oceangoing fleet maintain that a 
'balanced' fleet is essential for two reasons: 
(a) to protect Indian shipping which would otherwise be 
susceptible to enemy operations in time of war, i.e. a 
certain amount of sea control exercised in specified areas, 
and (b) to develop an ability to attack the enemy's vital 
maritime interests. For these reasons, not only is it 
necessary to have large ships, but there is also the 
lOO Because of decline in effectiveness of her Navy as a 
consequence of the stoppage of Soviet aid after Sukarno's 
overthrow. 
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necessity of acquiring Sea Control Ships carrying a mix 
of aircraft and ASW helicopters. 101 
With the development of offshore oil resources and 
the increasing importance of the New Economic Zone concept, 
indications are that India has decided to go in for the 
development of a 'balanced' fleet. Inaugurating a symposium 
on marine engineering last year the Defence Minister 
Jagjivan Ram stated that the government had dr·awn up an 
'ambitious' program to develop the Navy to protect the 
t , . . . 102 d . t. coun ry s maritime interests. A Coast Guar Organisa ion 
has also been set up to look after interests in the economic 
zone ~hereby implying a greater high seas role for the 
Navy in the future. 
lOl That the debate is still unresolved is evident from a 
series of articles, for and against, which appeared in 
Times of India in January-March 1978. The writers 
included Admiral S.N. Kohli (Former Chief .of Naval Staff), 
P.R. Chari (Director, Institute of Defence Studies and 
Analysis and former Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence) , 
Maj.Gen. S.N. Antia, Retd and Maj.Gen. E. Habibullah, Retd. 
102 d . . f Reporte in Times o 
carrier INS VIKRANT too, 
cost of Rs.170 million. 
6/1977, p.1188. 
India, May 14, 1977. The aircraft 
is being modernised at an estimated 
See International· Defense Review, 
..... 
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CHAPTER IV 
INDI~N nIR FORCE 1964-78 
Although the formal announcement of the decision to 
have a 45 squadron Air Force was made only in 1964-65 as 
part of the First National Defence ·Plan, 1 the 'Air ·Force 
was required to build up to its authorised ceiling of 45 
squadrons' soon after the 1962 conflict with China. 2 
Also, compared to the Army and the Navy, this service seems 
to have been less affected by financial constraints 3 and 
substantial acquisitions had been made in the 1953-62 
period so that by 1962 the Indian Air Force (IAF) consisted 
of 25 regular and 7 reserve squadrons 4 as against the 
original intention of having a 'balanced' force of 20 
5 
squadrons by 1960. 
Consequently, during the 1960-64 period, sustained 
efforts were already underway to improve the capability 
of the IAF, a step which was necessary considering the 
fact that the IAF possessed an extraordinary complexity 
of aircraft - some thirty different types of Russian, 
Canadian, French, British, American and indigenous 
1 Report 1964-65, p.l. 
2 Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh, 'The Indian Air Fo~ce and 
Its Role in the ~ountry's Defence', U.S.I. Journal, October-
December 1970, p.413. 
3 Lorne J. Kavic, ·India's Quest for Security: Defence 
Policies 1947-65, pp.108-109. 
4 ibi~., p.108. Also Appendix 10 in ibid. 
5 ibid., p.102. 
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manufacture. The IAF had already become the first service 
to receive Soviet e~uiprnent in the form of Mi-4 helicopters, 
Il-14 freighters and An-12 heavy transport planes during 
1960-62, 6 and, besides other efforts, initial talks about 
the purchase and domestic manufacture of the MiG-21 were 
already underway. 7 Also, negotiations had been completed 
for the purchase of SAM complexes which were to be installed 
. ' . . l ' 8 in certain vxta areas. Hence, the Plan did not involve 
any .planning as far as the IAF requirements were concerned 
and merely served to incorporate earlier assessments and 
projections. 
By 1964, India's search for aircraft had virtually 
become global. As a result, the United States, at various 
times was said to have been willing to provide F-102 all 
weather fighters, 9 F-51 Skyray10 or F-SB Freedom Fighters. 11 
One reason given for this in the press was that India was 
not in a position to acquire the MiG's as the cost of 
setting up the complex of factories was prohibitive and 
that the IAF senior officers, who were not particularly 
6 ibid., p.105. 
7 For details see ibid., pp.105-152. Also, Ian _C.C. Graham, 
'Indo-Soviet MiG Deal and its International Repercussions', 
Asian Survey, Vol.IV, No.5, May 1964, pp.825-830. 
8 Report 1964-65, p.39. 102 SA-2 missiles purchased at a 
reported cost of $12 million were said to have been installed 
at 17 sites. See· SIP RI Arms Trade .Registers, p. 35. 
9 H.R. Vohra in Times of India, January 26, 1964. 
lO Times of India, June 7, 1964. 
11 H. R. Vohia in Time·s of India, March 19, 19 65. 
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impressed with the MiG's, were said to prefer American 
aircraft. 12 There were also reports that the then Defence 
Minister, Y.B. Chavan had requested the United States to 
supply three squadrons of F-104G Starfighters during his 
visit to Washington in May, 196413 and that the US was 
d . h. 1 14 expecte to permit tis sa e. 
However, these attempts tlo not seem to have been 
successful and, as a consequence, an agreement for the 
supply of 3 Squadrons of MiG-2ls was signed during Chavan's 
. . l . · 15 
visit to Moscow ater during that year. Agreement was 
also reached on the domestic production of the aircraft. 16 
During the same period it was decided ·that the future · 
transport fleet would consist of (a) heavy types - the 
AN-12s acquired from the Soviet Union and (b) medium 
transports - yet to be decided upon although it was revealed 
that the suitability of the HS-748 was under consideration. 17 
Despite _substantial acquisitions from the Soviet Union 
in the form of AN-12 transports, Mi-4 helicopters 18 and 
12 Refer n.9. 
13 Times (London), May 15, 1964. 
14 H.R. Vohra in Times of 'India, June 29, 1964. 
15 Report 1964-65, p.39. 
16 For details see Lorne J. Kavic, pp.199-200. See also 
the relevant section in the chapter on defence production 
in this thesis. 
17 Report 1964-65, p.40. 
18 In fact the Soviet offer to product Mi-4's in India under 
licence from Avaiaexport was declined on the ground that the 
'numbers required did not justify their manufacture in India.' 
See Statement of the Minister of Defence Production 
K. Raghmamaiah in Parliament. Quoted in Lorne J. Kavic, p.197. 
...... 
71 
MiG-21 fighters, it should be emphasised that, their refusal 
to supply fighters to India notwithstanding, the Americans 
were still supplying other types of equipment and aircraft. 
M b · 1 d . 19 d d . . f 20 o i era ar units an Harvar trainer aircra t were 
provided and Washington agreed to help India establish an 
early warning system by supplying more powerful static 
installations/early warning stations 21 besides providing 
t . . f . 1 · . f 1 22 raining aci ities or IAF personne. 
The indigenously manufactured Krishak II was to replace 
Austers for air observation post (AOP) duties in the plains 
and it was decided to develop a more powerful version of 
the Krishak II for AOP tasks at high altitudes. 23 Extension 
and improvement work was sanctioned at 23 air.fields, 24 and 
it was decided that major repairs/overhauls of engines 
and airframes of aircraft of Soviet origin (except MiG-2l's) 
. 25 
would be done by the IAF. 
That the equipment and method of operation of the IAF 
were rather primitive even at this stage is clear from 
the recommendations of the high-level Committee on Safety 
that submitted its report in November 1964. Among other 
19 Lorne J. . Kavic, p.196. 
20 Report 1964-65, p .. 41. 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid. , p.44. 
23 ibid. , p. 41. 
24 . f d. Times o In ia, March 14, 1964. 
25 Report 1964-65, p.45. 
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steps, the Committee recommended (1) a revision of the 
Survey of India maps, (2) measures to improve the collection 
of meteorological data, (3) adoption of electric airfield 
lighting and ground control approach systems at all 
airfields and (4) provision of adequate numbers of fire 
fighting vehicles. 26 A decision was also taken to form an 
Operational Training . Unit for advanced training in 
fighters, a task hitherto performed by operational squadrons. 27 
However, the re-equipment program suffered a s~tback 
when an embargo was placed on supplies of military equipment 
by the United States and the U.K. as a result of the war 
with Pakistan in September 1965. 28 It was officially 
admitted in the Defence Ministry's Report of 1965-66 
that (the embargo) 'contributed to retard progress ... 
(toward the buildup to 45 squadrons) ... and have necessitated 
certain changes•. 29 The war was also the first time that 
the IAF was employed in an operational role since 
independence. 
Nevertheless, if would be incorrect to lay too much 
stress on the effects of the embargo by the Western powers. 
In the context of the IAF it amdunted to a shortage of 
spares and possibly ammunition and other 'commerci·a1' 
26 ibid., p.46. Some Ground 
Communication equipment were 
and one was set up initially 
See Report 1965-66, p.28. 
2 7 ibid. , p. 4 2 . 
Control Approach Radars and 
finally acquired in 1965-66 
for training the same year. 
28 Reported in Times, September 9, 1965. 
29 p.46. 
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equipment. 30 The only exception would be the supply of 
40 Hunter aircraft which Britain was reported to be 
willing to provide before the embargo was imposed. 31 
Also, by this time the Soviet Union was supplying a 
substantial part of Air Force requirements and no embargo 
was imposed by Moscow.· In fact, an agreement for the 
supply of 40 Mi-4 helicopters at a reported cost of 
$4.5 million was signed on March 7, 1965 32 and the Minister 
for Defence Production told Parliament on August 8 that 
three Tu-124s had been acquired for the communications 
flight. 33 Besides the Soviet Union, France, which was 
collaborating in the manufacture of Alouette III helicopters 
did not impose any embargo as the first Indian-assembled 
helicopter flew in June 1965 and regular production began 
in 1965-66. 34 
30 This was indirectly admitted by the Minister of Supply 
K. Raghuramaiah in Parliament on November 26, 1965, when 
he spoke of locating alternative sources while criticising 
Britain for stopping the supply of 'spares and other 
materials required for combatant and non-combatant aircraft'; 
that out of orders worth E7 million, only E500,000 worth 
of supplies had been received. Reported in Times of India, 
November 27, 1965, also· Times, November 27, 1965. 
31 H.R. Vohra in Times of India, March 20, 1965. 
32 Asian Recorder, 1966, 7005:INI:F. 
33 Reported in Asian Recorder, 1966, 7267:INI:F. 
34 This program is discussed in detail in the Chapter on 
Defence Production • . 
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In any case,the British restrictions were lifted in 
early 1966 35 while the U.S. State Department announced the 
lifting of the embargo on supply of non-lethal equipment 
on March 2, 1966 36 and sale of spares for lethal equipment 
was resumed in April 1967. 37 Also, while the United States 
decided to terminate the already suspended military 
assistance program (as also to Pakistan) in April 1961, 38 
two points are worth mentioning: 
a) although the value of military assistance actually 
provided was Rs.361.3 million as against the promise 
of Rs.760 million worth of equipment, 39 the bulk of 
the supplies under the aid program were non-lethal 
items such as road building machinery, transport 
. h' 1 d d d · · · 40 ve ices an ra ar an communications equipment. 
b) at about the same time the United States is said to 
have agreed to provide India with a $17 million loan 
to finance a military communication system project 
which had been decided on after the Sino-Indian conflict 
35 SIPRI. Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971), p.485. (Hereafter cited as 
SIPRI. Arms Trade with the Third World). 
36 . d Asian Recor er, 1966. 7004:INI:C. 
37 Refer n. 35. 
38 . f d. Times o In ia, April 13, 1967. 
39 Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan's statement i n Par l iamen t 
on November 29, 1965, reported in Times o·f India, November 30, 
1965. 
40 Times 0f India, April 18, 1967. 
_..... 
75 
41 d' h' ·1·t of 1962. Called Peace Inigo tis mi i ary 
conununication system was expected to link with the 
Air Defence Ground Environment System ·(ADGES) 42 
which is being set up with technical assistance from 
43 Thomson CSF (France). 
The acquisition of fighter aircraft, however, 
proceeded very slowly till 1967'when 36 Hunter F-56 and 
12 Hunter T-66D refurbished aircraft were purchased from 
the U.K., 44 in response to an offer which was reported to 
have been made in '/early 1965. 45 While domestic m,anufacture 
of the Gnat continued, the production of the Marut HF-24 
fell considerably behind schedule and this was the probable 
reason for an order from the Soviet Union for 100 Sukhoi 
SU-7 aircraft, at a unit cost of $1 million which were 
delivered between 1968 and 1970. 46 Thus by 1969-70, the 
Defence Ministry officially announced that the MiG-21 and 
SU-7 squadrons were at full strength and Vampire and 
41 SIPRI. Arms Trade with the Third World, p.485. 
42 Report 1969-70, p.29. 
43 Jane's Weapons Systems 1978. Equipment for this includes 
mobile and statis 3-D radars which are being manufactured 
under licence at the Ghaziabad unit of Bharat Electronics 
Ltd., planning for which conunenced in 1967. See· Times of 
India, November 22, 1967. 
44 STPRI. Arms Trade Regi·sters (Stockholm: Almqvist & 
Wiksell, 1975), p.35. 
45 H.R. Vohra in Times of India, March 20, 1965. 
46 Refer n. 44. 
Toofani aircraft were being phased out, while admitting 
that the Mysteres would be retained in active service 
till they were replaced by HF-24s. 47 
These purchases notwithstanding, the aircraft 
acquisition policy of the Government still remained to 
be worked out in detail and it was to this end that 
an Aeronautics Committee was set up in late 1967, 48 
headed by the then Industries Minister, C. Subramaniam. 
The aim of the committee - was to review the entire field 
of research, development and production of - aircraft and 
allied equipment and to advise the Government on the 
7G 
quickest and most economical way of achieving self-sufficiency. 
In its report submitted in 1969, the committee recommended 
the development of an advanced technology aircraft around 
a proven engine (obviously imported) along with the 
simultaneous development of an indigenous advanced technology 
engine. With regard to bombers, the committee made it 
quite clear that India's domestic needs did not justify 
h . d . f 49 t eir ome_stic manu acture. In other words replacements 
for the aging Canberra's were to come from abroad. 
In what was described as an attempt to facilitate 
the implementation of these proposals, it was decided that 
future r~quirements of new aircraft for the IAF would be 
'as far as possible, met by indigenous production'. A 
47 Report 1969-70, p.29. 
48 Times of India, November 11, 1967. 
49 Reported in Times of India, May 16, 1969. 
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10 year requirement plan was approved and this included 
the replacement of Gnats by an improved version of the 
MiG-21. 50 Even then, some indecision still prevailed. 
Studies for the selection of a suitable medium type 
transport were expected to be completed by 1970 - more than 
six years after they began and, possibly as a result of 
this delay the indigenously manufactured HS-748s replaced 
the obsolete Dakotas in the communication and training 
roles. 51 The idea of having a more powerful version of 
Krishak for AOP tasks at high altitudes was ' finally given 
up in favour of using helicopters52 - the SA315B Cheetah, 
a derivative of the Alouette III. 
Possible reasons for the indecision in the bomber 
procurement policy were obviously the failure of the Mach 2 
version of the HF-24 to materialise as also the unsatisfactory 
delivery schedule of the Mach 1 (Marut) version. Meanwhile, 
there must have been some attention devoted to alternatives, 
since, according to at least one newspaper report,during 
his visit to India in 1968, the Soviet Defence Minister 
Grechko was approached with an Indian request to manufacture 
the MiG-23. 53 Soon after a British team visited India 
with an offer for the manufacture of Jaguar aircraft under 
1 . 54 icence. Financial constraints were probably a major 
50 Report 1969-70, p.29. 
51 ibid. ' p.30. 
52 ibid. 
53 Ernest Weatherall in Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1969. 
54 ibid. 
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obstacle because instead of replacing the ag~ng Canberra 
bomber1 India purchased 10 Canberra B(l)l2 aircraft from 
55 New Zealand and another batch of 12 Canberra B-15 and 
16 ex-RAF refurbished aircraft from U.K. 56 during 1970-71 
to bring the 3 existing squadrons to full strength. 
Substantial reorganisation, in order to increase 
administrative efficiency,was also undertaken during these 
years. Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) was made responsible 
for procurement of all spares, imported as well as domestic. 57 
Previously, different aspects of a single aircraft or 
weapon system were dealt with by different directorates 
of the IAF. This was now changed and integrated cells in 
the maintenance branch wer~ formed. 58 The four technical 
branches of the IAF were integrated into two technical 
59 branches. 
55 Times of India, November 20, 1970. 
56 Times of India, November 26, 1970. The purchase from 
UK was made with the concurrence of the United States as the 
bombers although British built, had some US manufactured 
ancillary equipment. This was the second time that the US 
lifted its arms embargo to facilitate acquisition of lethal 
weapons by India (the first instance was the sale by Britain 
of Hunter aircraft within some months of the 1965 confl·ict) 
but this was offset by the US d~cision to seil 1/2 squadron 
of identical aircraft, along with interceptor aircraft and 
armoured .personnel carriers to Pakistan. 
57
· Report 1969-70, p. 31. 
58
· Report 1969-70, p.28. 
59 These were (a) Aeronautical Engineering (Mechanical) 
branch out of technical engineering and technical armament 
branches and (b) Aeronautical Engineering (Electronics) 
branch out of technical electrical and technical signals 
branches. See Report 1971-72, p.69. 
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The performance of the IAF during the 1971 war was 
quite satisfactory, despite a shortage of suitable aircraft 
imposed by financial constra.ints. Vampire and Harvard 
trainer aircraft were refitted and equipped with Air-Surface 
rockets for ground support roles, AN-12 transport aircraft 
were used for carpet bombing and aircraft were modified 
to use electronic counter measure (ECM) equipment. 60 
Also the air defence and communications system, 
ADGES had not begun to be implemented until early 1971 61 
when an agreement was signed with Radio Engineering 
Laboratories (New York) for the supply of $4 million worth 
of radio equipment - the first instalment for the microwave 
system. 62 However, before much could be accomplished on 
the Peace Indigo project war broke out in December 1971 
and the United States Government embargoed new aid commitments 
and suspended the licensing of military shipments to India, 
so the project came to a halt. 63 Meanwhile, indigenous 
development efforts on ADGES as a whole ·continued, from 
60
· Report 19 71-72, p. 66. The Indian MiG-21 is probably 
the only aircraft of its type in the world that incorporates 
EW Suite AR-753, RWR, pad mounted jammers and reconnaissance 
pads of Swedish manufacture. The same equipment that is 
used in the Viggen. See The In terna tion·a1 Coun terrneasures 
Hqndbook 1977-78, EW Communications Inc~ Palo Alto, 
California, p.198. 
61 Report 1971-72, p.68. 
62 William Drummond in Australian, July 2, 1974. 
63 See Statement of Minister of Defence Production, 
V.C. Shukla in Parliament. Reported in Times of India, 
March 29, 1974. 
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1971-72 at 9 research and training centres. 64 A Tropo 
Spheric Training School to cover Radar apd Tropo Spheric 
Scatter Communication Systems was established at Delhi 
(later moved to Bangalore) 65 and automatic air defence 
data handling systems were developed at the Tata Institute 
of Fundamental Research, Bombay, while Electronics 
Corporation of India Ltd. (ECIL), Hyderabad, a government 
undertaking, was entrusted with the manufacture of antenna66 
and other equipment by Bharat Electronics .and Indian 
Telephone Industries. 67 
The first high power static radar was successfully 
completed by the Radar and Communication Project Office 
(RCPO) and handed over to the IAF in 1976 while a second 
one was expected to be operationa_l by June, 1978. 68 
The communications part of ADGES, i.e. the Peace Indigo 
project resumed only in late 1973/early 1974 when the US 
Government lifted the embargo imposed earlier. 69 It was 
also reported at that time that sophisticated electronic 
warfare systems such as the Watkins-Johnson QRC-259 
collection system might also be supplied to India. 70 This 
64 These included the 5 Indian Institutes of Technology, 
Indian Institute of Science Bangalore, National Physical 
Laboratory Delhi, Institute of Radio Physics and Electronics 
Calcutta, and the University of Roorkee besides the Defence 
R & D Laboratories. See Report 1975-76, p.26. 
65 Report 1974-75, p.45. 
66 ibid., pp.46-47. 
67 Report 1975-76, p.25~ 
68 Report 1977-78, p.30. 
69 Refer n. 6 3. 
70 International Defense Review, 1/1974, p.26. 
........ 
... 
I· 
111 
program has been divided into various stages by region 
and phuse. The links in the first stage were expected 
to become operational by January 1979, and the second 
stage is scheduled for completion by early 1980. 71 
Bl 
While completing -of ADGES was delayed because of 
external difficulties, aircraft acquisition - trainers, 
transports and bombers - has been a victim of indecision, 
delays in domestic production as well as financial 
. 72 
constraints. The replacement program for the medium 
transport fleet is a good example. While the long term 
perspective plan for the transport fleet was scheduled to 
be finalised by 1970 (as mentioned earlier), the only 
decision that could be reached by 1974-75 was that pending 
policy formulation, a military freighter version of the 
HS-748 would be inducted into the IAF 73 to reduce the 
multiplicity of types in service. There is also some 
evidence to suggest that this decision was not entirely 
74 
welcome to the IAF. 
71 Report 1977-78, pp.30-31. 
72 The problem of finance is significant because over the 
years the capital outlay on the Navy increased while that on 
the IAF decreased. For example the capital outlay on the 
IAF as a percentage of total capital expenditure on the armed 
forces declined from 38.4% in 1965-66 to 14.6% in 1970-71 
and 11.7% in 1975-76. The capital expenditure on the Navy 
during these years increased from 7.7% to 34.3% and 37.4% 
respectively. Figures based on Defence Services Estimates, 
1962-63 - 1973-74 as quoted in Raju G.C. Thomas, 'The 
Politics of Indian Naval Rearmament 1962-1974', Pacific 
Community, Vol.6, No.3 and Defence Services Estimates 1977-78. 
73 Report 1974-75, p.41. 
74 P.V.R. Rao, Defence Without Drift (Bombay: Popular 
Prakashan, 1970), p.240. 
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With regard to trainers, the original intention was 
to ~cquire the indigenously manufactured HJT-16 Kirans but 
shortfall in domestic production forced the IAF to look 
abroad for the replacement of Harvards and Vampires. 
There were some reports of an impending agreement with 
Czechoslovakia for the purchase of Aero L-39 trainers 75 
but this obviously did not materialise. An order for 50 
Polish WSK-Mielec TS-11 Iskra Jet trainers was placed 
in May 1965 and these aircraft were delivered from 1976 
onwards. 76 This, coupled with a restructuring of the IAF 
training program is reported to have produced an embarrassing 
surplus of Kirans, some of which are now going into storage. 77 
In the case of MiG-21 too, domestic production 
is reported to have failed considerably behind schedule. 
Against a projected annual production. rate of 30, only 
10-15 MiG-21MS could be built, 78 resulting in an import 
of 50 MiG-21 PFMAs from the Soviet Union during 1974-76 79 
to equip two squadrons. There were also said to have been 
other problems - the Soviet Union is reported to have held 
up spare part shipments after the 1971 war. 80 Licence 
75 SIPRI. · Yearbook 1975, p.230. 
76 SIPRI. Yearbook 1976, p.264. 
77 1. h . 1 Fig t Internationa, July 8, 1978. 
78 1. h . 1 Fi~ t Internationa, March 8, 1978, p.756. 
79 Of these 27 were delivered complete from the USSR and 
23 assembled in India from ·knocked down parts. See SIPRI. 
Yearbook 1975, p.209. 
BO Ravi Rikhye in Armed Forces Journal International, 
March 1975, p.14. 
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payments .were reported to have been demanded in dollars 
instead of in kind as had been the practice earlier~ 81 
This could have been a consequence of excessive dependence 
on the Soviet Union which came about during the IAF 
ex~ansion in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, 
as is discussed below, the situation has altered radically 
over the last few years for reasons not unconnected with 
the program for the replacement of the light bomber fleet 
i.e. the acquisition of the Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft 
(DPSA) . 
Apart from the delay in the finalising of the medium 
transport policy, the decision on replacing the Canberra 
and Hunter aircraft took a long time to reach agreement -
a decade after the necessity was first recognised. 
In this instance it was not the lack of availability of 
suitable aircraft. The predominant problem was one of 
finance. The Defence Ministry, in its annual Report of 
1974-75, revealed that a long term plan for the strike 
element of the IAF had been drawn up. While making a 
passing ~eference to the fact that indigenous development 
and production of long range strike aircraft were under 
consideration, it went on to admit that the Government was 
on the look out for more sophisticated aircraft 'for 
induction to the IAF consistent with the availability of 
81 SIP RI. Yearbo·ok 19 7 3, p. 36 3 . 
--
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resources•.
82 The same point was made by a usually well 
informed journalist in a leading national daily, who wrote 
that although the need for replacement of the light bomber 
fleet had been accepted in principle, the finance required 
was not immediately available. 83 This limitation was 
stated more explicitly in the Defence· Report of 1976-77 
wherein it was stated that the IAF was: 
... now entering a phase of modernisation of 
its aircraft and equipment ... a balance has, 
however, to be struck between needs, costs, 
dependence on imports and the requirements of 84 
other spheres of national growth and development. 
However, Indian balance of payments situation improved. 
Foreign exchange reserves rose significantly in the period 
from 1976 85 and the acquisition of the DPSA, given the long 
standing req~irements, became inevitable. Three aircraft 
were considered. As not only available but also satisfying 
Indian operational requirements, they were the Anglo-French 
Jaguar, the French Mirage F-1, and the Swedish Viggen. 86 
Also, the manufacturers ·Of all three aircraft agreed to 
the two Indian pre-conditions i .. e. (a) manufacture of the 
82 p.40 . . Emphasis added. 
83 Dilip Mukerjee in· Times o·f India, April 3, 1976. 
84 p.24. 
85 By 1978, the foreign exchange reserves amounted to 
$7 billion approximately. See The Economist, December 30, 
1978, p.36. 
86 It was also report~d that the Soviet Union offered India 
the MiG-23, SU-20 and SU-22 along with proposals for their 
manufacture under licence but the offer was turned down as 
none of the aircraft met the minimum requirement of a range of 
300 nautical miles. See Times· of India, February 10, 1978. 
Also International Defense Review, 7/1978, p.1161. 
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selected aircraft in India, and (b) a buy-back plan under 
which the ~anufacturer would purchase Indian-made spares, 
sub-assemblies and other equipment. 87 
Accordi~gly, an Indian team visited the manufacturers' 
establishments in February 1978, 88 ostensibly to open 
negotiations as also to see the plants and submitted its 
report to cabinet towards the end of March. 89 The 
Government decision to acquire the Jaguar .was formally 
announced in October, 1978. But, there is some evidence 
to suggest that the Government of India had made up its 
mind in favour of the Jaguar as early as January 1978 
when the British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, during 
his visit to New Delhi was reported to have told a press 
conference that a team of British experts would be visiting 
India shortly to 'continue negotiations on the proposed 
Jaguar deai. 90 The fact that the United States refused 
to approve the Swedish sale of Viggens to India, despite 
a personal request by the Swedish Commerce Minister, 
Linder, effectively removed the Viggen from contention. 91 
87 . f a. Times o In ia, March 28, 1978. 
88 T. f d. imes o In ia, February 10, 1978. 
89 Refer n. 87. 
90 P.R. Chari in Times of India, January 20, 1978. Callaghan 
is also reported to have discussed this issue with the Indian 
Finance Ministe~H.M. Patel who was on his way to New York, 
in September 1978, a few weeks before the decision was announced. 
See G.K. Reddy in Hindti (International Edition), Odtober 28, 
1978. 
91 1 . h . d . U.S. approva was necessary since t e engine an certain 
electronic equipment in the Viggen are manufactured under U.S. 
licence. For details see Aviation Week &. Space Technology, 
August 7, 1978, p.20. Also Flight International, August 18, 
1978, p.521. 
The official reasons given for the choice were 
(a) the terms of payment were the most favourable, 
86 
(b) British Aerospace offered the quickest delivery schedule 
and (c) it was the only contender which had two engines -
thereby providing an additional safety factor. 92 The 
deal reportedly worth about Rs.1.3 billion (approx. E816m.) 93 
provides for the acquisition of one squadron (18-20 aircraft) 
on lease from the RAF by the middle of 1979 after which 
British Aerospace would begin deliveries .at the rate of 
two aircraft per month at a unit cost ranging between 
Rs.60 million and Rs.80 million depending on the equipment 
and spares specified by India. 94 The leased aircraft are 
proposed to be returned to the RAF by mid-1980 by which 
time the first operational squadron would be formed. 
According to present plans, India proposes to purchase 
about 40 Jaguars (2 squadrons) before the first phase of 
indigenous manufacture begins in 1980. About 110 to 120 
planes are to be built under licence by 1985 to raise about 
six to seven squadrons in all, replacing the Canberra and 
. 95 Hunter squadrons. 
Just after the decision on the Jaguar was announced 
that a Soviet delegation led by the Deputy Minister for 
· Aviation Industry, I.S. Silayev, visited ·India in the last 
92 f • • • • I d ' De ence Minister JagJivan Rams statement reporte in 
Overseas Hindustan· Ti:r:rte'S, November 2, 1978. 
93 A. Hariharan in Far Eastern Economic Review, October 20, 
1978, p.37. 
94 Flight 'International, November 4, 1978, p.1630. 
95 G.K. Reddy in Hindu (International Edition), October 28, 
1978. 
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week of October and several agreements for the transfer 
of technology relating to the production of the MiG-21 BIS 
variant as also to accelerate the pace of indigenisation 
were signed. These were precisely the areas where Soviet 
cooperation had not been very forthcoming. The possibility 
of export of Indian made spares and accessories to equip 
Soviet MiG-2ls is also· to be explored. 96 
Conclusions: 
The expansion and modernisation of the IAF in theory 
at least was set in motion in the early 1960s, much before 
the Defence Plan of 1964. Delay in its implementation was 
inevitable given the pro-West attitude of the IAF senior 
officers which later changed primarily because of Western 
unwillingness to provide modern fighter aircraft to India. 
Other equipment, such as radar systems and conununication 
equipment however, has continued to be bought from Western 
sources or manufactured in India under licence, despite 
occasional embargoes by the United States. While the reason 
for this could have been the lack of availability of such 
equipment from the Soviet Union, this could also be viewed 
as an attempt to diversify sources of supplies and as 
further evidence of the fact that preference for W~stern 
equipment still persists. 
In terms of organisational infrastructure i.e. development 
of airfields and acquisition of allied equipment, much 
effort had to be put in during · the 1960s, to remedy the 
96 See Editorial in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.XIII, 
No.42, October 21, 1978. See also Hindu (International Edition} 
October 28, 1978 and Flight International, November 4, 1978, 
p .16 30,. 
..... 
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neglect of the 1950s. This would seem to have been due 
to lack of proper planning and assessment of the operational 
requirements of the IAF. But then, this in a somewhat 
lesser sense is also a factor that prevailed in the 1960s 
especially in the context of the aircraft acquisition policy. 
The lack of a comprehensive plan for the transport fleet 
is a case in point. Uncertainties in the delivery schedule 
of aircraft being indigenously manufactured97 could have 
been an additional factor contributing to haphazard planning. 
Also, the IAf does deserve credit for improvisation 
and getting the best performance from whatever aircraft 
and equipment it did possess. The incorporation of Swedish 
ECM equipment in MiG-2ls ideal example. This . is an lS 
despite drawbacks as in the context of the bomber fleet 
because even the Soviet built SU-7 aircraft do not seem 
to have been very successful operationally98 and the 
decision to replace the Hunter and Canberra bombers took 
a decade to materialise. The Jaguar agreement, in a way, 
can be interpreted as an indication of the inability of 
Soviet aircraft to satisfy Indian operational requirements 
although the modified MiG-21 is likely to remain a front-
line interceptor in the IAF well into the 1980s. 
The radar and communications network (ADGES) has 
fallen considerably behind schedule, primarily because 
97 This aspect is discussed in detail in Chapter Von 
Defence Production. 
98 See Flight Internatic~al, July 8, 1978. 
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of US embargoes but, one long term benefit of this has 
been to accelerate the attempts at indigenisation. Thus, 
when ADGES becomes fully operational, sometime in the 
early 1980s, it can be assumed that the whole system 
would not be so susceptible to stoppages of spares as it 
would have been the case earlier. 
I'~ 
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CHAPTER V 
DEFENCE PRODUCTION - 1964-78 
Defence production in India dates back to the 
period of British rule but serious attempts at expanding 
the production base began only in the late 1950s under the 
stewardship of the then Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna 
Menon. Besides expanding the network of Ordnance Factories, 
many public sector undertakings (some started from scratch 
e.g. Bharat Electronics, but mostly nationalised 
e.g. Mazagon Dock, Hindustan Aeronautics) were brought 
under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence 
because they were expected to engage primarily in production 
to meet defence requirements. This ·trend became more 
obvious in the 1960s when serious efforts to acquire self-
sufficiency in this field got underway. 
The object of this Chapter is to examine the performance 
of the Defence Research and Development as well as production 
organisations and attempt to establish whether the numerous 
official $tatements about the achievement of self reliance 
are borne out by facts. 
The defence production sector at present consists of: 
A. 31 Ordnance Factories including 5 in the 
Ordnance Equipment Factories (OEF) Group. 
B. Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) 
comprising 9 major companies under the 
administrative control of the Department of 
Defence Production. 
~! 
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The production efforts of the Ordnance Factories and 
the DPSUs during the 1964-78 period shall also be examined. 
DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION 
The Defence Research and Development Organisation 
(DRDO) has a two-tier organisational structure: 
1. The headquarters, responsible for policy planning, 
control, co-ordination and liaison with the armed 
forces. 
2. A field network at present consisting of 31 Rand D 
establishments and laboratories apart from a work 
study institute and evaluation and analysis groups. 
The entire organisation is under the Director General 
of Defence Research and Development, who is also the 
Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister and an ex-
officio Secretary in the Ministry of Defence. In practice, 
5 per cent of the organisational effort is devoted to basic 
research, 35 per cent to applied research and 60 per cent 
1 to development. 
For policy .direction at the top governmental level, 
a Defence Research. and Development Council, with the Defence 
Minister as chairman, was created in 1962 2 and it was only 
1 A. Rehman et.al., 'The Financing of Scientific and 
Technological Research in India' in Th~ Role of Science and 
Technology in Economic Development, Science Policy Studies 
and Documents, No.18 (Paris: UNESCO, 1970), p.191. 
2 National Science Policy and Organisation of Scientific 
Research in India, Science Policy Studies and Documents, 
No.27 (Paris: UNESCO, 1972), p.33. 
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after this that emphasis on Defence R & D increased. 
This is evident by the fact that the R & D budget increased 
from Rs.520 million in 1962-63 3 to about Rs.1,600 million 
in 1969--70. 4 In 1965-66 a new Apprentice Scheme was 
introduced for the recruitment of civilian scientists 
and work during this period was concentrated on development 
of items like grenades, mines, HF and VHF Sets, generating 
sets etc. The next few years saw further expansion of the 
R & D effort as research problems began to be given to 
various other institutions and universities. But there 
seems to have been a degree of lack of co-ordination 
between the DRDO and the various production establishments 
since, for example in 1969-70,· the DRDO had to undertake 
pilot production of as many as 51 items developed by them 
as either the quantity required was too small or no 
production ba~e was available. 6 
There would also seem to have been a lack of 
perspective planning during this period as it was only in 
1969-70, that a five year R & D plan was drawn up. This 
plan catered for an increase in expenditure from Rs.1,600 
million in 1969-70 to about Rs.3,000 million (including 
civil works) by 1973-74. 7 In 1970-71 it was decided that · 
3 Report 1971-72, p.103. 
4 Report 1969-70, p.63. 
5 Report 1965-66, pp.58-59. 
6 Report 1969-70, p.65. 
7 ibid., p.63. 
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the plan would be based on the 'Roll-On' concept and 
it is from this time that there is evidence to suggest 
that attempts were made to outline R & D priorities and 
steps taken to streamline the organisational structure. 
Emphasis was to be laid on missile development and on the 
development of strategic materials, particularly metals 
and alloys required in the production of aircraft, missiles 
and electronics. A separate Aeronautics R & D Board was 
constituted and for the co-ordination of radar and 
communication (electronics) activities a new planning unit 
was formed. In an obvious effort to expand the R & D 
base, it was also decided that the Defence Public Sector 
Undertakings (DPSUs) and Ordnance Factories would have 
their own in-house R & D facilities. 9 
However, these initial attempts at long term planning 
do not seem to have been very successful. After announcing 
that a 5-year roll-on - plan had been introduced in 1971-72, 
the Ministry of Defence Report went on to reveal that ·a 7-year 
plan for the period 1972-79 was under preparation. That 
since a good R & D base to undertake research in conventional 
fields had already been built, emphasis would now shift 
to research on missiles, liquid and inertial navigation 
10 
systems, naval underwater weapons, and radar technology. 
8 Report 1970-71, p.67; 
9 Report 1972-73, p.82. 
lO ibid., pp.82-86. 
Even this plan had problems of implementation because 
the very next year, in 1973-74, a new plan covering the 
1974-79 period was drawn up. Measures were also taken 
94 
to associate producer organisations in early stages so that 
the R & D efforts were 'consistent with the constraints 
of industry•. 11 Although long overdue, steps to co-ordinate 
R & D with production capabilities were finally initiated. 
Thus, it is only in the 1970s that the DRDO has been 
able to achieve, albeit haltingly, a certain degree of 
co-ordination. The R & D infrastructure has also developed 
and links have been established with various other R & D 
establishments in the country like the Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research (CSIR), Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC), Departments of Electronics (DE), Science and Technology 
(DSST) and various institutes of technology and science 
which undertake research on projects farmed out by the DRDo. 12 
The expenditure by the DRDO itself has shown a consistent 
increase over the years, from Rs.2,537 million in 1972-73 
and Rs.4,830 million in 1975-76 to an estimated Rs.5,184 
million (1977-78) . 13 
11 Report 1973-74, p.89. 
12 For instance, the Plan allocations for Defence Projects 
undertaken by the Department of Electronics have increased 
from approximately Rs.2 million in 1975-76 and Rs.8.3 million 
in 1976-77 to the present (1978-79) estimated expenditure 
of Rs.18.1 million. See, Govt. of India,Department of 
Electronics, Performance Budg~ts 1976-77 and 1978-79. 
13 Govt. of India, Defence· Services Estimates 1977-78. 
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Although the results of the R & D efforts have been 
far from spectacular, there has been some contribution 
towards attaining the goal of self-sufficiency. Indigenously 
developed 105 mm., 120 mm. guns, 75/24 mm. pack howitzer 
and 57 mm. Anti-Tank guns are now in regular production. 
Besides, ammunition and spares for various imported weapons 
and other equipment are being manufactured indigenously. 
Battlefield surveillance radars, VHF sets and electronic 
· h 14 secrecy equipment ave also been developed locally. 
In recent years, further progress has been made and 
development of more sophisticated equipment has been 
undertaken. Items like training simulators for two 'existing 
aircraft', and advanced gas turbine engine, and armour 
material for tanks are currently under development. A 
locally developed rocket for the Navy is expected to go in~o 
production shortly and a pilot plant for the production of 
rocket fuel is also in advanced stages of planning. 15 But, 
while the R & D capability of the DRDO is expected to improve 
further in future years, the scanty information available 
indicates that difficulties still persist in upgrading 
laboratory level technologies to a commercial scale. 
14 . Report 1971-72, pp.105-106. 
15
· Report 1977-78, pp.94-99. 
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ORDNANCE FACTORIES 
Ordnance factories in India have a relatively long 
history, and the first ones were established by the British 
long before independence. Nevertheless, substantial 
development and expansion occurred mainly in the post-1962 
period and specially as a result of the First National 
Defense Plan drawn up in 1964 which had a composite 5-year 
outline for modernisation and expansion of Ordnance Factories 
at an estimated cost of Rs.332 million with a foreign 
exchange component of Rs.152 million. 16 
Six new factories were envisaged in the first phase 
of the expansion scheme but since the plan itself was 
heavily dependent not only on foreign exchange but also 
on -foreign technical assistance, adherence to the program 
was minimal. Formally opened on October 15, 1964, the 
Varangaon small arms ammunition plant was formerly the 
St. Louis Ammunition Factory provided by the United States, 17 
which also furnished consultancy services for the Ordnance 
Fa.ctory at Ambajhari, 18 producing 81 mm. mortar shells. 
Although the latter was planned on the basis of U.S. aid 
under the Military Credit Sales Program, U.S. military 
assistance was suspended as a consequence of the 1965 war 
and the factory was eventually set up without f oreign aia. 19 
16 Report 1964-65, p.51. 
17 Lorne J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security: Defence 
Policies 1947-1965, p.205. 
18 Report 1964-65, p.54. 
19 Report 1965-66, p.38. 
Likewise the filling factory at Chandrapore was also 
adversely affected by the suspension of British aid in 
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1965 and equipment and machinery were subsequently obtained 
by expenditure of free foreign exchange. 20 The Bhandara 
Filling Factory which began production in January 1965 
was set up with British assistance at a cost of Rs.160 
· 11 · 21 mi ion. 
Possibly as a consequence of the .stoppage of Western 
aid after 1965, and also due to the high costs, particularly 
the foreign exchange content, the government abandoned 
plans to set up the Burla Explosives Factory and the 
Panvel Propellant Plant which were together estimated to 
cost Rs.620 million including Rs.200 million in foreign 
exchange. The requirements, it was argued, would be met 
b k · 1 · 22 y stoc piing. Nevertheless, the government did go 
ahead and set up the small arms. factory at Tiruchirapalli 
at a cost of Rs.130 million, designed and built totally 
b d . h . . 23 y In ian tee nicians. Formally inaugurated on July 3, 
1966, this factory highlights the basic problem of defence 
production in India - the vast gap between initial 
requirement .and long term needs. Three lines of production 
had been envisaged - carbines, 7.62 mm. rifles and light 
20 'b'd l l • 
21 Lorne J. Kavic, p.205. 
22 Statement of Minister of Defence Production, A.M. Thomas, 
as reported in Times of India, December 20, 1964. See 
also Report 1964-65, p.54. 
23 Times of India, July 4, 1966. 
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machine guns. All the three items were already in 
production - rifles at Ishapur, carbines and LMGs at Kanpur, 
so Tiruchirapalli was meant to supplement production. 
Eventually, this unit ended up manufacturing only 
carbines, not only because of the slackening of demand as 
army re-equipment got well under way, but also because of 
technical bottlenecks and lack of production equipment. 24 
. f h . · 1 h · h · 25 Assistance rom t e civi sector soug tint is context 
does not seem to have been very effective, primarily 
because of lack of technical sophistication. 
Besides the setting up of these factories, a number 
of new items like medium and heavy mortars, recoilless 
anti-tank guns and related armnunition for the Army, bombs 
and 30 nun. armnunition for the Air Force etc. were also taken 
up for manufacture in the Ordnance factories already in 
existence. Items previously imported, parachutes for 
example, were now manufactured indigenously. The late 1960s 
also saw the beginnings of export attempts by Ordnance 
factories, clothing and other Army software in the first 
instance, as domestic orders were completed. The foreign 
exchange earnings of Ordnance factories since they first 
undertook exports (1966-67) till 1971-72 for instance 
amounted to Rs.270 million. 26 Profit from the manufacture 
24 Dilip Mukerjee in Times of India, October 31, 1970. 
25 
·Report 1966-67, p.40. 
26 Report 1971-72, P .. 77. 
of civil trade items in 1969-70 for example, was 
Rs.8.851 million. 27 
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Despite the increase in production during this period 
two major shortcomings persisted (a) this increase was 
confined mostly to small arms and ammunition and non-lethal 
stores; (b) due to the emphasis in setting up new units, 
modernisation of the· already existing units tended to be 
neglected. This situation was further aggravated by the 
increasing pressure on already scarce resources and 
consequently a modernisation program in real earnest began 
only in the 1970s, with a project for the fillununition Factory 
and Explosives Factory being approved in 1971-72 at an 
estimated cost of Rs.60.5 million and Rs.97.7 million 
respectively in the first stage. 28 In 1972-73, the Cordite 
Factory at Aravankadu and the Metal and Steel Fa.-::tory at 
Ishapur were also included, 29 but further details of the 
program, which is said to involve a total outlay of Rs.320 
·11· 30 k mi ion, are not nown. 
In the early 1970s further expansion of the defence 
production effort has also taken place. Items like Air-Air 
Air-Surface rockets, 30 mm. Aden gun barrels (for use 
in Gnat/Ajeet aircraft), 1,00 lb bombs for the Air Force, 
27 Report 1970-71, p.38. 
28 Report 1971-72, p.74. 
29 Report 1972-73, p. 4 8. 
30 . . Economic Times (Bombay) , January 16, 1975. 
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4", 4.5" and 6" ammunition, anti-submarine rockets for the 
Navy have been taken up for mariufacture. Self-sufficiency 
has been achieved not only in small arms, but also in 
items like field and mountain guns, anti-aircraft guns. 31 
This _is, however, the result of a planning and 
decision-making process which leaves much to be desired. 
Plans have often gone awry and the same can perhaps be 
said of decisions and implementation. The Indian designed 
105 mm. field gun, for example, was tested in the early 
1960s but the project for its manufacture was sanctioned 
only in October 1971 (at an estimated cost of Rs.486.8 
million) . 32 This was a time when the necessity to replace 
the WWII 25 pounder with this gun was supposedly very urgent, 
so manufacture of this weapon for the interim period, it 
was decided in 1973-74, 33 would be undertaken using existing 
capacity for the manufacture of other guns. Produc-tion 
of the 105 mm. field gun finally commenced in 1974-75, 
4 years after the original decision and it was expected 
that regular manufacture would begin by about 1977. 34 
Likewise, the project for an alloy and special steels plant, 
which was being planned as early as 1961-62, 35 was finally 
sanctioned in November 1971. 36 .Being set up at Kanpur at 
31 Report 1975-76, p.29. 
32 Report 1972-73, p.47. 
33 Report 1973-74, p.46. 
34 Report 1974-75, pp.50-51. 
35 Report 1961'-62, p. 36. 
, 
36 Report 1972-73, pp.46-47. 
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an estimated cost of Rs.480.1 million, it is still not 
known when production will begin. In the meantime however, 
most of the alloy and special steel requirements for the 
manufacture of ordnance hardware continue to be imported. 
Likewise, the propellant and ballistics project, which was 
shelved in 1964-65, was finally sanctioned in 1970, and 
went into production in 1975-76. 37 The indigenous manufacture 
of ammunition for the 130 mm. Soviet guns which were 
imported in the mid-1960s, was sanctioned as late as 
1973-74, 38 and production of this ammunition (till then 
imported) was expected to begin. in 1977. 39 Manufacture 
of 9 mm. pistols and 7.62 nun. medium machine guns (for 
infantry and armour roles) sanctioned in September 1971 was 
also likely to begin in 1977. 40 Not surprisingl~, none 
of these projects have commenced production in 1977-78. 41 
Vehicles: 
Three different types of vehicles have been in 
p·roduction in the Ordnance Factories. 
37 Report 1975-76, p. 30. 
38 Report 1973~74, p.46. 
39 Times · of India, August 19, 1974. 
40 ibid. 
41 Report 1977-78, p.34. 
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1. The three-ton Shaktiman trucks in collaboration 
with Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg AG (M.A.N.) 
of the Federal Republic of Germany. 42 
2. Nissan one-ton trucks and Nissan Patrol Jeeps 
(referred to as 'Jongas' in India) in pursuance 
of collaboration agreements signed with Nissan 
Motor Company of Japan in 1960-61. 43 
In the early sixties these vehicles (with the 
exception of Shaktiman) were more or le~s being assembled 
in India. For example in 1963-64, the indigenous· content 
of Nissan one-ton, Nissan Patrol and Shaktiman tr,ucks 
was 35 per cent, 28 per cent and 61 per cent respectively. 44 
Indigenous content of these vehicles tended to increase 
somewhat in the following years, but a separate factory 
for the manufacture of these vehicles was established, as 
late as 1970 45 at an estimated cost of Rs.160 million, 
where the assembly of Nissan Patrol and Nissan one-ton 
vehicles commenced in March and November 1970 respectively, 
that of Shaktiman 3-ton trucks in late 1971-72, and regular 
production in 1973-74.'16 Even then, engine blocks and. 
42 This was undertaken in September 1959 after reported 
Government dissatisfaction with the performance of private 
Indian suppliers and the first truck rolled off the assembly 
line at the Gun Carriage Factory at Jabalpur on June 21, 
1959. See Lorne J. Kavic, p.129. 
4 3 ibid. , p. 130. 
44 Report 1964-65, p.53. 
45 Consequent to a decision taken in 1965-66. 
46 Times .of India, September 19, 1970. 
,~ 
103 
castings for the above vehicles continued to be imported 
because of lack of a captive foundry, which was established 
only in the mid-1970s. 
As of 1976-77, the indigenous content of the Shaktiman, 
Nissan 1-ton and . Nissan Patrol was approximately . 94 per 
cent, 80 .per cent and 82 per cent respectively47 - not a very 
creditable performance, considering the fact that they have 
been.· in production for over 15 years, and were expected 
to be completely indigenised by 1977. 48 
Tanks: 
In January 1961, a team headed by the then Chief -of 
Army Staff, Lt. Gen. L.P. Sen visited F.R.G. and Britain 
to select a suitable tank for domestic production. Turning 
down an offer by a subsidiary of Daimler-Benz to design 
a tank suited to Indian conditions, the proposal of Vickers-
Armstrong (U.K.) to modify the Chieftain to Indian 
specifications was accepted. · Of a planned production of 
1,000, -the first 40 units were to be built in Britain; 
components of subsequent units were to be shipped to India 
for assembly at a plant set up at Avadi, where they · would 
ultimately be manufactured. 49 
The first Vijayanta (modified Chieftain) tank rolled 
off the assembly line in the last week of December, 1965 50 
47 Report 1976-77, p.30. 
48 Report 1975-76, p.30. 
49 Lorne J. Kavic·, pp.130-131. 
50 Report_l965-66, p.42. 
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but only 20 units were reported to have been produced 
in 1967-68. 51 Set up to have a capacity to manufacture 
100 tanks per year, 52 the Heavy Vehicles Factory at Avadi 
has obviously not been able to attain this rate of production, 5·3 
resulting in heavy imports from the Soviet Union. 
Problems have been many - ranging from insufficient 
domestic armour production capability to lack of 
subcontractors willing to manufacture various parts. 
There also seems to have been a shortage in the production 
of its 105 54 which resulted in imports from mm. main gun 
Australia. 55 There were also problems with indigenisation; 
of the raw materials required, some were not available in 
the country; of others the quantity required was too small 
to justify local manufacture, or production fell short of 
requirements. 56 Nevertheless, the indigenous content by 
value rose from 60 per cent in 1970-7157 to 65 per cent 
in 1971-72 58 and is now reported to be about 94-95 per cent. 59 
51 SIPRI. Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971), p.743. (Hereafter cited as 
Arms Trade with the Third World). 
52 Minister of Defence Production, A.M. Thomas, as reported 
in Hindu _(Madras), November 9, 1964. 
53 According to Jane's Weapons Systems 1978, 'over 600' 
tanks have been produced in dver 10 years of their manufacture. 
54 Report 1974-75, p.51. 
55 International Defense Review 6/1976, p.1030. 
56 Dilip Mukerjee in Times of India, October 26, 1970. 
57 Report 1970-71, p.42. 
58 Report 1971-72, p.74. 
59 SIPRI Yearbook 1978, p.215. See also Overseas Hindustan 
Times, July 13, 1978. 
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However, as discussed earlier, due to the unsatisfactory 
performance of the Vijayanta, its future manufacture would 
b . 60 seem to e uncertain. 
Besides tanks, various other modifications based on 
the Vijayanta chassis i.e. armoured recovery vehiGles, 
and self propelled guns, developed by the Defence Research 
and Development Organisation (DRDO) at Avadi have also 
gone into production. Progressive development and indigenous 
manufacture of armoured per$onnel carriers has also ·begun . . 
DEFENCE PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS (DPSUs) 
The 9 companies in this sector can be subdivided into 
two categories: 
1. Companies where production primarily caters to 
defence customers while also undertaking manufacture 
of items for civil use. These would consist of 
a. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. 
b. Bharat Electronics Ltd. 
c. Mazagon Dock Ltd. 
d. Bharat Dynamics Ltd. 
e. Mishra Dhatu Nigam Ltd. (still .to begin production). 
2. Companies which manufacture primarily civil equipment 
with only marginal production for defence purposes. 
a. Goa Shipyard Ltd. 
b. Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Enginee~s Ltd. 
60 See Chapter II, pp.37-38 in this thesis. 
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c. Praga Tools Ltd. 
d. Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. 
HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS LIMITED (HAL), BANGALORE 
The Hindustan Aircraft Limited was established in 
December 1940 as a limited company owned jointly by the 
Government of Mysore and Walchand Hirachand with the 
Government of India joining in as a shareholder by 
pqrchasing the entire interest of the latter in 1941. Its 
original program was the assembly of Harlow trainers 
(August 1941) and Curtiss Hawk fighters (July 1942) but 
during the Second World War, the factory was transformed 
into a Repair/Overhaul Base and air~r·aft production was 
suspended. In 1948, the Company took up the design and 
development of the Basic Jet Trainer HT-2, completing it in 
1953, and, besides other projects, also undertook the 
assembly and manufacture under licence of Vampire Jet 
Fighters and Prentice Trainers. In 1957, the manufacture 
under licence of Gnat fighters and Orpheus engines was taken 
up, and in 1959 that of Dart engines for the Avro-748 
(later called HS-748) transport aircraft being manufactured 
by the Aircraft Manufacturing Depot at Kanpur (set up in 
1959). 
In August 1963, Aeronautics India Limited, a public 
sector company, was formed to establish and manage the three 
factories for the manufacture of MiG-21 aircraft. In 
an attempt to streamline the aircraft industry, Hindustan 
107 
Aircraft and Aeronautics India were merged on October 1, 
1964 and the new company re-designated as Hindustan 
Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) which also took over the Aircraft 
Manufacturing Depot, Kanpur. Also, the Railcoach Division 
of the Hindustan Aircraft Division was separated and 
transferred to the management of Bharat Earth Movers 
Limited w.e.f. January 1, 1965. 
Currently, the following types of aircraft and 
aero-engines are heing manufactured by the company: 
(a) · Aircraft: 
HJT-16 KIRAN 
AJEET 
BASANT 
CHETAK 
(ALOUETTE III) 
CHEETAH 
(SA -315) 
HS 748 MF 
Basic jet trainer, designed and 
developed by HAL. 
Fighter aircraft, improved version 
of GNAT, developed by HAL. 
Single seat agricultural aircraft 
designed and developed by HAL. 
Multipurpose helicopter being 
manufactured under licence. 
Light helicopter for AOP role in 
the Himalayas, being manufactured 
under licence 
Military freighter version of the 
twin engined transport aircraft 
manufactured under licence. 
After a recent restructuring of its organisation of 
HAL now consists of three complexes: 
1. Bangalore co·mplex: which comprises the following uni ts:· 
a. Airframe and Aircraft Assembly: Produces the 
Ajeet interceptor/gr.ound attack fighter, the 
Kiran (HJT-16) jet trainer and also overhauls 
various types of aircraft. 
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b. Aeroengine Factory: Produces the Artouste III-B 
turboshaft helicopter engines in collaboration 
with Turbomeca (France), the Orpheus 701 and 703 
turbojet engines for Ajeet and Marut fighters, 
the Orpheus 70102 (derated 701) used as a thrust 
booster for the Fairchild Packet transport aircraft, 
and the Dart 531 turbo-prop engines used in the 
HS-748 - all in collaboration with Rolls Royce (U.K.) 
c. Design Complex: This division has in the past 
designed (i) the Marut ground attack fighter and 
trainer versions; (ii) the Kiran HJT-16 jet 
trainer; (iii) Basant agricultural aircraft and 
(iv) the Ajeet interceptor. The unit is now working 
on the development of the following aircraft: 
(i) HPT-32, a two seater piston engined aerobatic/ 
trainer; ( ii·) Ki ran MKII, a variant of the Kiran 
MKI designed for armament training and counter-
insurgency role; (iii) Ajeet trainer; (iv) HF2 4 
variant which is intended to be an improvement 
over the Marut, in that it will have double the 
payload and endurance capability; (v) Advanced 
Light Helicopter, being designed in collaboration 
with Aerospatiale (France). 
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d. Helicopter Division: Manufactures the 7-seater 
Chetak (Al-III) and the 5-seater Cheetah (SA-315) 
helicopters in the transport, armed and agricultural 
versions, in technical collaboration with 
Aerospatiale. 
2. The MiG Complex: Consisting of three divisions: 
(i) Nasik Division: Manufacture of airframes and 
aircraft assembly. 
(ii) Koraput Division: Production has centred on the 
R-ll-F2-300 engine for the MiG-21 FL and the 
R-ll-F2S-300 engine for the MiG-21M. 
(iii) Hyderabad Division: Electronics and A-A missiles 
for MiG-21. 
3. Accessories· Complex: Consists of 
(i) Lucknow Divisi·on: Manufactures · brakes, wheels, 
instruments, ejection seats etc., under licence. 
(ii) Hyderabad Division: Electronics Factory. 
Manufactures equipment for MiG aircraft besides 
others, under licence. 
Each of. these complexes is headed by a separate Managing 
Director. Besides these, there is the Kanpur Division which 
produces ·the HS-748 aircraft, under a General Manager who 
reports directly to the Chairman. 
HF-24 MARUT 
This project was taken up in 1956 61 under the direction 
of Dr Kurt Tank, 62 the initial plan being to use two Orpheus 
61 Dilip Mukerjee in Times of India, October 24, 1970. 
62 The German aircraft designer who designed the FW 190. 
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703 turbojet engines for the transonic Mkl version 
and a single Orpheus 12 turbojet for the supersonic Mk:II 
. f 63 air rame. The first prototype MkI flew in June 1961 
followed by second prototype MkI in October 1962. 64 
As far as the MkII was concerned, it never really got off 
the ground because of the lack of a proper engine. India 
turned down the offer by Bristol to develop the Orpheus 
12 provided the former accepted the financial liability, 65 
and unsuccessfully experimented with Soviet Klimov VK-7 
turbojet and the RD9-F engines, spending about $3 million 
h . 66 on t ese abortive programs. Unsuccessful attempts were also 
made to use the Egyptian E-300 turbojet. 67 Subsequently, 
India is reported to have sought help from British and 
American sources and representatives from Rolls Royce and 
experts from the USAF research and development centre 
at Dayton, Ohio visited India in July 1964. However, the 
Inda-Soviet agreement in September 1964 on the MiG project 
virtually ended all chances of Western aid. 68 
63 The Orpheus 12 engine was being developed by Bristol for 
the NATO competition and its completion was subject to its 
acceptance by NATO countries. See Arms ·Trade with the Third 
World, p.745. 
64 Jane's All the World Aircraft, 1973, p.745. 
65 Dilip Mukerjee in Times of India, October 24, 1970. 
66 For an excellent discussion of the politics of the HF-24 
program see Arms Trade with the Third World, pp.745-748. 
67 'b. d i l • 
68 Lorne J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security, p.205. 
r ': 
r: 
111 
The first of 18 pre-production Maruts (HF-24 MkI) 
flew in March 1963 and a token delivery was made to the 
IAF on May 10, 1964, 69 but the first flight of the series 
production Marut could take place only on November 15, 1967. 70 
The following table indicates the delays in the delivery 
schedule of the aircraft in the 1960s: 
1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 
First aircraft 
delivery schedule 6 10 24 22 
First modification 7 11 30 14 
Second modification - - 18 18 
Third modification - - 6 10 
Actual delivery 1 6 1 8 
Source: Arms T~ade with the Third World, 
1973, p.748. 
However, 125 Maruts were said to have been built by 
January 31, 1977 71 and the production program seems to 
72 . · 73 have ended in late 19-77 as scheduled. 
69 Jane's All the World Aircraft, 1973, p.745. 
70 'b'd i i • 
71 'b'd i i • 
1968-69 
18 
18 
72 N.N. Sachitanand in Hindu (Madras) International Edition, 
July 29, 1970·. 
73 D 'd ' . . k h 1 . avi A. Brown in Aviation Wee & Space Tee no ogy, 
January 17, 1977, p.15. 
r 
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In 1967, design work was also initiated on the HF-24 
Marut I1', 2 seat tandem trainer74 and the first prototype 
began test flights on April 30, 1970 followed by a second 
prototype in March 1971. 75 In all 15 trainers had been 
delivered to the IAF by January 31, 1977. 76 Two prototypes 
of what have been referred to as the reconnaissance version 
of the Mark I using the Orpheus 703 equipped with after-
burner giving Mach 1.4 capacity were also built, but 
further work seems to have been stopped after one was lost 
. in an accident in 1969. 77 
Overall, the HF-24 program has been far from 
successful, with the aircraft being able to join squadron 
service more than 10 years a!ter development actually 
began. Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, the Design Complex 
is working on a Variant model (HF-25) and the Gas Turbine 
Research Establishment (GTRE) at Bangalore is reported to 
74 SIPRI Yearbook 1973, p.365. 
75 Jane's All the World -Aircraft, 1973, p.745. 
76 ibid. There is however some controversy as to how many 
trainers were actually ordered/delivered. SIPRI Yearbook 
1973 states that 'by mid-1972 firm Air Force order for 25 
planes for delivery from 1974', (p.365) while SIPRI Yearbook 
1977 says that 10 had been required by the Air Force and 
produced (p.290). SIPRI Yearbook 1978 states that of a 
total requirement of 20, 10 have been delivered and 
'production may terminate'. In any case whatever be the 
total number produced, production 'has· been phased out'. 
Refer N.N. Sachitanand, n.72 above. 
77 SIPRI Yearbook 1973, p.365. See also Dilip Mukerjee, 
n.61 above. 
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have developed the GTX series of engines, 78 different 
versions of which will be used for the HF-25 MkI and 
HF-25 MkII variants. 79 Design work is also said to be in 
progress since 1969 on an advanced version multi-role 
combat aircraft designated HF-73 Marut MkIII, with the 
prototype scheduled to fly in 1980. But the proposal to 
power the HF-73 with twin Rolls Royce RB199 turbojets 
is reported to have been unfeasible for both financial 
and technical reasons. 80 
MiG-21 
The project for the manufacture of the MiG-21 in 
India is said to have resulted indirectly from the interes-
in acquiring a Soviet power plant for the HF-24, 81 after 
unsuccessful attempts at acquiring American F-104 aircraft 
for the IAF in 1964. 82 The phased program of production 
outlined by Mr A.M. Thomas, the Minister for Defence 
Production, in 83 1965 was as follows: 
78 These are said to have a very high thrust to weight 
ratio and are reported to be comparable to the Mirage's 
Ater turbojet in power i.e. in the 7,200 kg (15,870 lb) 
thrust class. International Defens~ Review, 2/1976, p.308. 
79 It is reported that GTS-14U will be retrofitted to the 
MiG-BIS and HF-25 MkI and GTX 37-14UB, a by-pass version of 
the former would be suitable for the HF-25 MkII. · Ref. 
N.N. Sachitanand~ n.72. 
80 International Defense Review, 4/1976, p.535. 
81 Arms Trade with the Third World, p.748. 
82 For a detailed discussion of the efforts at F-104 
acquisition and the subsequent dedision to establish the 
MiG Project see Lorne J. Kavic, pp.198-200. 
83 As reported in Times of India, March 9, 1965. 
Phase I 
Phase II 
Phase III 
Phase IV 
: From major assemblies. Commencing 1966. 
• .
. 
. 
From sub-assemblies. 
From detailed parts. 
: From raw materials. Commencing 1969-70. 
Production under Phase I assembly from imported 
components of the program began in late 1966, with the 
first deliveries to the IAF in 1967. About 100 were 
mbl d - . h. 84 asse e int is way. Even at the early stages the 
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project seems to have run into considerable trouble, including 
a shortage of trained te~hnicians and problems of translating 
h . 1 f . 85 tee nica documents rom Russian. Three factories were 
envisaged for the MiG complex: Nasik (airframes), Hyderabad 
(electronics and later A-A missiles) and Koraput (engines). 
The last of these did not enter production until December 
1968 and no HAL-'built' engines were installed in HAL-assembled 
aircraft before 1969. Even after this, in 1970 also the 
output of engines was reported to be well below capacity. 86 
The first MiG-21 FL built from 'raw materials' was handed 
over to the IAF on October 19, 1970. 87 Production of this 
model was said to have ended in 1971 and is believed to 
88 have totalled 196. 
84 Jane's .All the World's Aircraft, 1977-78, p.85~ These 
were the MiG-21 FL, Soviet export designation of the MiG-21 PF. 
85 Dennis Childs and Michael Kidron, 'India, the USSR and 
the MiG Project', Economic and Political Weekly, December 22, 
·1973, p.1724 quoting the HAL Annual Report, 1965-66. 
86 'b'd i i • 
·
87 Times of India, October 19, 1970. 
88 Dilip Mukerjee in Times of· India, October 24, 1970. 
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In 1972 an official Indian team left for Moscow to 
finalise arrangements for the production of the MiG-21M 
which was expected to begin in 1973-74. 89 ~he first HAL 
'built' MiG-21M was handed over to the IAF on February 14, 
1972 90 and about 15 were reported to have been delivered 
by Spring 1974. 91 Also the Soviet terms for licence 
production seem to have been changed as licence payments 
were reported to be no longer payable in kind, but in dollars. 92 
Indigenisation too, is reported to have proceeded rather 
slowly since the first MiG-21M produced 'entirely' at 
the Nasik Division ·(Airframe and assembly) was handed over 
h . . 93 tote IAF in December 1975. 
An improved version of the MiG, the MiG-21MF (Fishbed J) 
having the more powerful Tumansky R-13-300 turbojet and 
increased fuel capacity is now expected to be taken up for 
d t . 94 pro uc ion. 
Overall, the program for MiG production has not been 
very successful, which is not at all unusual taking into 
consideration the HF-24 and the HJT-16 experience. The 
89 Times of IDdia, Jnauary 13, 1972. 
90 Times of India, February 15, 1973. 
91 Refer n.88. Because of this shortfall, 50 Soviet built 
MiG PFMA's had to be imported to supplement Indian production. 
92 SIPRI Yearbook 1973, p.363. 
93 Times of India, December 2, 1975. 
94 . . Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1977~78, p.45. Earlier 
reports that the IAF might take up the Rolls Royce offer to 
re-engine MiG-2ls with Spey engines were discounted in India 
because it was considered that despite the advantages the 
investment made in HAL's Koraput (Engine) Factory was too 
great to be discarued as also the cost and time scale of such 
a modification would be prohibitive. See International 
Defense Review, 2/1976, p.308. 
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production rate has been about 10-15 aircraft per year95 
as against an estimated capacity of 30 aircraft per year. 96 
The basic unit cost of an Indian-made MiG was estimated 
at Rs.11.6 million, as against the estimated import price 
of about Rs.6 to Rs.7.5 million. 97 In 1971-72 the foreign 
exchange content of aircraft then in production was between 
30 and 55 per cent 98 -and an estimated Rs.7 million in terms 
99 
of value. Hence the program does not seem to have resulted 
in large savings in foreign exchange,nor in any substantial 
degree of self reliance. Although MiGs currently in 
production have an estimated indigenisation level of about 
60-70 per cent, 100 there is near total reliance on external 
sources (i.e. Soviet Union) with regard to raw materials 
like special alloys and steels, as well as some of the 
electronics. Consequently, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that the MiG project still remains dependent on 
Soviet supplies, in that it would come to a .halt if the latter 
95 Flight International, March 18, 1978, p.756. 
96 Arms Trade .with the Third World, p.725. 
97 ibid. The unit cost has been calculated on the basis of 
sales and production figures for 1972-73. The USSR sales 
price (as given in Arms . Trade with the Third World, p.739) 
is further substantiated by their calculations of the unit 
sales price of the first 39 aircraft which were only 
assembled in India, amounting to Rs.7.7 million per aircraft. 
98 ibid. Quoting statement of O.P. Mehra, Chairman of HAL. 
99 ibid., p.1726. 
100 · SIPRI Yearbook ·1979, p.216. 
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were withdrawn. There do not seem to have been any visible 
spin off benefits in the form of growth of design or 
production capability based on the MiG experience, which 
has been a closed one with theSoviet Union not even 
supplying India with any detailed design or type approval 
d t 101 a a. 
HJT-16 KIRAN 
Development of the HJT-16 Kiran two-seat basic jet 
trainer was sanctioned in December 1959, and detailed 
design work began in April 1961. 102 The first prototype 
flew for the first time on September 4, 1964, followed by 
a second aircraft in August 1965. 103 But the series production 
of the aircraft has been much behind schedule, due to 
. l h 104 materia s ortages. 
* HJT-16 delivery schedule: 
1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 
First schedule 9 15 
First modification 3 15 27 
Second modification - 7 18 
Third modification - - 6 
Fourth modification - - -
* Actual delivery by 1969.1 
1968-69 
15 
27 
16 
7 
Source: Arms Trade with the Third World, p.752. 
1969-70 
8 
24 
11 
lOl Arms Trade with the Third World, p.749. 
said that 'requests for the supply of these 
side have been turned down'. 
It is also 
from the Indian 
102 Arms Trade with the Third World, p.752. 
103 Jane's All the World's Aircr~ft, · 1977-.78, p.8D. 
l0 4 SIPRI Yearbook ·1973, p.367. 
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Consequently, by mid-1970 only about 40 HJT-16 had 
105 106 been completed and a total of 113 by January 31, 1977. 
Along with the development of the HJT-16 Kiran, work 
had also begun on the HJE-2500 turbojet engine for the 
trainer, 107 which was expected to replace the Rolls Royce 
. -
Bristol Viper II turbojet engine from the 100th aircraft 
· g 108 ub 1 . d . d d . in 1 74-75. Buts sequent y it was eci e to re-engine 
the Kiran with the HAL-built Orpheus 701 engine derated to 
3,500 lbt (1590 kp), thus putting an end to the chances 
of the 2,500 lbt HJE-2500 going into production. 109 It 
was also decided that the 116th and sub~equent aircraft 
(designated MkII) be fitted with a hard point beneath each 
· l . 110 f wing capab e of carrying weapons or drop tank or 
armament training and the counter-insurgency role. 
The first prototype of the HJT-16 Kiran Mk.II fitted with 
derated Orpheus 701 was fabricated in 1975-76111 and made 
its first lfight on July 30, 1976, 112 but flight testing 
105 'b'd l l • 
106 Jane's All tha World's Aircraft 1977-78, p.80. 
107 Arms Trade with the Third World, p.752. 
l0 8 SIPRI Yearbook 1973, p.367. 
109 
·International Defense Review, 6/1975, p.9 25 . the Orpheus 
701 as fitted on the Gnat develops 4,520 lbt (2,050 kp) 
thrust for takeoff, compared to only 2,500 lbt (1,135 kp) 
of the Viper II. 
llO Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1977-78, p.80. 
111 Report .1976~77, p.50. 
112 Report 1977-78, p.62. 
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was suspended later that year, following some engine 
intake problem, and was scheduled to start again in early 
1977. 113 
GNAT MkI/AJEET 
The licence for indigenous production ,of Gnat MkI 
aircraft was acquired in September 1956114 along with the 
supply of 23 British built Mkis and 20 sets of comp·onents 
in 1958-60. 115 The first Gnat Mk:I assembled in India flew 
for the first time on November 18, 1959, the first built 
fully by HAL on May 21, 1962 and full production began in 
1963. 116 Successive orders for 100, 43 and 50 aircraft 
were completed with the last one being delivered on January 
31, 1974. 117 By 1972 the indigenous content of the Gnat 
airframe and engine was about 85 per cent and 60 per cent 
respectively and was expected to rise further. 118 
A total of 215 aircraft were produced with the last 
two being used as prototypes for the MkII version - the 
Ajeet. 119 Begun as the Gnat MkII in June 1972, this developed 
version was then renamed Ajeet and unlike the MkI (interceptor ) 
113 Refer n.103. 
114
· Arms Trade with the Third World, p.751. 
115 Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1975-76, pp.102-103. 
116 ibid. 
11 7 ibid. 
118 Arms Trade· with ·the Third World, p.751. 
119. Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1·975~16, p.103. 
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is being produced primarily for the ground attack role. 120 
The first Ajeet prototype, a Gnat with less than the full 
range of modifications, first flew on March~' 1975 and 
the second prototype on November 5, 1975 followed by the 
first production Ajeet on September 30, 1976. 121 Besides 
increased combat c.apabili ty, the aircraft has updated 
avionics including new VHF equipment being produced by BEL 
under Bendix licences122 and the new Ferranti ISIS195 
(Integrated Strike and Interception System) two-axis rate 
gyro gunsight which is to be licence-produced by HAL's 
k . . . 123 Luc now Division. Although the import content of this 
aircraft is not known, it is reported that various 
b . . d 124 components are eing importe . It is also reported 
that HAL is likely to update some of the recent Gnats to 
h . d d 125 t e AJeet Stan ar. 
Although .rroduction of the Ajeet began in 1975-76126 
and deliveries (against an order of 100) were expected to 
120 H.P. Mama, 'Ajeet - The IAF's New Ground Attack Fighter', 
International Defense Review, 6/1977, p.1088. 
121 'b'd l l • 
122 ibid., p.1090. 
123 International· Defense Review, 3/1978, p.447. This gunsight 
also equips the HF-24 Marut and will be fitted to the armed 
Kiran MkII. 
124 These include aileron power control units, landing gear 
retraction jacks, filters, flow restrictors, foot brake 
pumps and various types of valves to be supplied by 
Automatic Products Ltd. (U.K.). See Intarnatiohal· Defense 
Review, 5/1975, p.766. 
125 Refer H.P. Mama, n.120( p.1090. 
126 Report 1976-77, p.49. 
121 
begin in Spring 1977, 127 problems related to 'deve~opment 
and productionising of the aircraft' were encountered in 
1976-77, 128 making a delay in the aircraft delivery schedule 
seem very likely. 
The project for the Ajeet tandem trainer version was 
also sanctioned in February 1976. The first prototype 
is expected to fly in late 1979 and the first production 
129 
model around 1981. 
HS-748 
Agreement for the manufacture under licence of the 
HS-748 was signed with Hawker Siddeley (U.K.) on July 7, 
1959 and that for its power plant, the Rolls Royce Dart 
RDa 7 Mk531 turboprop engine on December 30, 1959. The 
project seems to have been taken on wi~hout any planning130 
at the (then) Aircraft Maintenance depot at Kanpur which 
could not devote sufficient effort to the production program 
while at the same time its repair and overhaul facilities 
were also said to have suffered when needed most i.e. during 
127 Jane's All theWorld's Aircraft 1977-78, p.84. 
128 Report 1977-78, p.61. 
129 Refer n.122. 
130 Arms Trade with the Third World, p.751. It is also 
reported that the then Defence Minister Krishna Menon wanted 
the first Indian-assembled HS-748 to fly even before the 
first prototype did in U.K. (G.K. Reddy, Times of India, 
August 11, 1964). Work began in 1960 but sanction for the 
buildings was not given till 1963 and as a result, even in 
1964, simultaneous construction and production was going on 
in some hangers. 
122 
the conflicts with China and Pakistan. 131 The program 
is reported to have been further delayed due to 'funding 
and material problems•. 132 
The first four HS-748s were Series 1 ·aircraft using 
imported components, and the first one flew on November 1, 
133 1961, followed by a second one on March 13, 1963. The 
first of the Series 2 aircraft flew on January 28, 1964 
and by the end of 1964, 4 had been manufactured, 134 
followed by 3 each in 1965-66135 and 1966-67136 respectively. 
Nevertheless, no decision was taken to manufacture the 
military freighter (MF) version for a long time, (this 
was criticised by the Public Accounts Committee in 1966137 ), 
and as late as 1970-71, the proposal to manufacture the 
MF . . 11 d . . d . 138 version was sti un er consi eration. However, a 
prototype was produced shortly after. Flight trials began 
in March 1972 139 and an order for 10 HS-748 (MF) was 
placed in 1975, 140 more than 10 years after production began. 
131 ibid. , p. 75 0. 
132 SIPRI Yearbook 1973, p.365. 
133 Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1977-78, p.84. 
134 Report 1964-65, p. 
135 Report 1965-66, p.46. 
136 Report 1966-67, p.46. 
137 Arms Trade with the Third World, p.750. 
138 Report 1970-71, p.48. 
139 SIPRI Yearbook 1973, p.365. 
140 This was reported to have been chosen in preference to 
the Buffalo for which adequate credits were not available. 
See International Defense Review, 5/1975, p.766-
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The first of these was scheduled to be ready by mid-1977, 14 1 
and the production run of the HS-748 MF is expected to 
end by late 1977. 142 
HAL ALOUETTE III (SA316B) CHETAK 
Production ~f the Alouette III helicopters began under 
the licence granted by Aerospatiale (France) in June 1962, 
and the first Indian assembled helicopter was flown for 
the first time on June 11, 1965, 143 but subsequently the 
program is reported to have falled considerably behind 
schedule as shown in the table below: 
Alouette III Delivery Schedule: 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
- 65 - 66 - 67 - 68 - 69 - 70 
First Plan 1 10 45 44 
First Modification - 9 17 46 28 
Second Modification 15 32 49 16 
Third Modification 20 33 52 
Fourth Modification 8 12 30 
Fifth Modification 4 12 
Actual Delivery 4 7 4 
Source: Arms Trade with the Third World, p.752. 
1970 
- 71 
36 
18 
141 ibid. The MF version will also have the more powerful 
Rolls Royce RDa.5.32 engines. 
142 David A. Brown, 'India's Aircraft Industry Grows', 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 7, 1977, p.15. 
14 3 Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1·9 77-7 8, p. 8 3. 
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Production of Turbomeca Artouste IIIB 870 shp turboshaft 
engines commenced in 1965-66144 and by mid-1972, HAL is 
said to have produced 85 helicopters. 145 
An armed version of the Alouette III, known as the 
Chetak, has also been developed by HAL. The Chetak carries 
4 SS-11 Anti-Tank missiles on laterally mounted booms and 
preliminary trials are reported to have been successful. 146 
It is a stripped down version, with its gross weight 350 kg 
less than the Alouette III, and a higher ceiling of 6,370m. 
compared to · 4,250m. of the latter. 147 
HAL also supplies Indian built components, fuselage 
sections, doors etc. for French built helicopters. 148 
HAL (SA315B LAMA) CHEETAH 
The Cheetah was designed in 1968 by Aerospatiale to 
meet Indian requirements for a high altitude helicopter149 
for use in the Himalayas, and uses the same pbweiplant as 
the Chetak. Agreement for its manufacture under licence 
144 6 66 Report 19 5- , p.46. 
145 
·sIPRI Yearbook 1973, p.365. This figure appears to be on 
the high side sine~ Jane's 1977-.78 gives a total of 193 Al 
IIIs produced by January 31, 1977 (also confirmed by SIPRI 
Yearbook 1978, p.215). Since only 15 were delivered between 
1964-65 and 1970-71, it would appear that 70 were produced 
between 1970-71 and mid-1972 and only 108 being produced 
during the period 1972-73 to January, 1977. 
146 Jane's All t~World's Aircraft 1977-.78, p.83. 
147 Flight International, February 22, 1973, p.264. 
148 . Refer n.146. See also SIPRI Yearbook 19·73, p.265. 
149 SIPRI Yearbook 1973, p.265. 
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in India was signed in September 4, 1970, 150 and a 
helicopter factory was set up, with an estimated capital 
expenditure of about Rs.344.4 million, the first Indian 
assembled Cheetah being test flown on October 6, 1972. 151 
Production of helicopters manufactured from raw materials 
is reported to have begun in 1976-77152 with a total of 
50 delivered by January 31, and 16 more scheduled for 
delivery by .end of 1977. 153 
HAL LIGHT HELICOPTER: 
This successor to the Cheetah is being co-developed 
with Aerospatiale under the 1970 agreement. This high 
performance helicopter is to be powered by a 1030 KW T~rbomeca 
Astazou XX turboshaft engine and two versions are being 
developed: a standard version for the Army/IAF with combat, 
communication, armed reconnaissance, rescue and training 
mission capability, and a naval version for anti-submarine, 
air-to-surface search and strike duties besides reconnaissance, 
1 . h d . k 154 rep enis ment an evacuation tas s. No civilian version 
is planned. 
150 Report 1970-71, p.48. 
151 Refer n.146. 
152 ibid. 
153 ibid. See also SIPRI Ye~rbook 1978,. p.215. 
154 Refer n.146. The project is reported to be at an 
advanced stage and 6 prototypes are to be built of which 
the first is due to fly in 1981. See also Aviation Week 
& Space Technology, March 13, 1978. 
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Overview: 
Summing up, the experience of the aircraft industry 
in India has not been a very successful one. Most 
aircraft taken up for production, MiG-21, Gnat, HS-748, 
Cheetah and Chetak helicopters have been undertaken under 
licence arrangements. The same holds true of their power 
plants. HAL themselves have been able to develop the HT-2, 
a basic trainer, Pushpak and Krishak light aircraft, and 
HF-24 Marut and HJT-16 Kiran, a basic trainer. But even 
these have tended to depend on licence produced power 
plants, besides substantial import content in the -form of 
various components. Contrary to initial expectations, the 
MiG project has not given the industry any significant 
experience in aircraft design and development. Another 
problem has been that the Bangalore complex has been loaded 
with too many projects which have not only resulted in 
spreading the resources too thin, but have also tended to 
retard progress. Also the lack of a sophisticated tack-up 
industrial infrastructure has slowed attempts to progress 
towards setf-sufficiency. Ancillary industries outside HAL 
have been virtually non-existent so far and consequently 
the Company has had to set up its own accessories production 
facilities, or rely on imports. Efforts at indigenisation 
have also met with very limited success, there being virtually 
no domestic capacity to produce strategic alloys and special 
155 
metals. 
155 h , d' • h • I Te in igenous content int e companies 
accessories and consumables' was 32 per cent 
Notes on Important Public Sector Projects of 
of Defence Production 1977-78, p.2. 
'raw materials, 
in 1975-76. See 
the Department 
1., 
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As a consequence aircraft produced within the country 
have tended to be more expensive than procurement from 
abroad, the increase ranging from 50 per cent to 90 per 
. 156 
cent over imports. 
Planning of various projects has also left much to 
be desired. For example, the production run of the HF-24 
· Marut and HS-748 MF was scheduled to end in late 1977 and 
late 1978 respectively, but no alternative plans to utilise 
the available capacity seem to have been formulated so far. 
As regards future plans, the Subramaniam Committee 
on Aeronautics, keeping in view the limitations of the 
industry, had made two recommendations: 157 
(a) A new advanced technology engine to be built 
around a proven engine (obviously imported). 
(b) Indigenous design and development of an advanced 
technology engine to be undertaken simultaneously, 
to replace the proven engine eventually. 
Subsequently, various plans to develop advanced technology 
combat ·aircraft 'rivalling the capability of America's 
Phamtom and France's Mirage 1158 'comparable to any similar 
aircraft in the world 1159 to enter service in the 1980s have 
156 For a detailed discussion see Arms Trade with the Third 
World, pp.738-740. 
157 Times of India, May 16, 1969. 
15 8 f · · · · k . . th P 1 . t De ence Minister JagJivan Ram spea ing in e ar iamen 
as quoted in Fli9ht International, January 14, 1971, pp.70-71. 
159 The then Minister for Defence Production~V.C. Shukla's 
statement in the Parliament as reported in Times of India, 
April 26, 1974. 
been repeatedly talked about, and if agreement for the 
import and eventual manufacture of the Jaguar aircraft 
128 
is any indication, the earlier statements would seem to 
have been merely for public consumption. This is because 
the intention is to acquire a proven aircraft instead of 
only a proven engine! 
BHARAT ELECTPONICS LIMITED (,BEL) , BANGALORE 
Bharat Electronics Limited was established as a public 
sector company in April 1954 following a technical 
agreement signed with C.S.F. of France for technical 
collaboration in the manufacture of electronic equipment 
including vacuum tubes, components and radar. The factory, 
set _ up in Bangalore, commenced production 'on a small scale' 
in January 1956. The value of production and the types of 
equipment produced increased and diversified during the 
following years as a result of further collaboration agreements 
entered into with Pye Telecommunication Ltd. and Marconi 
of England, Philips of Holland, Siemens of Germany, Nippon 
Electric Company of Japan, Contraves of Switzerland and 
Radio Corporation of America. In 1964, further collaboration 
agreements were signed with Siemens of Germany and Radio 
Corporation of America for the manufacture of ~hat was 
d , b d I ' d f ' • ' I 160 escri e as important e enc.e communications equipment. 
160 Report 1964-65, p.58. 
